Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions

Abstract

Austerity measures in many European countries have led to the violation of social rights and widespread socioeconomic malaise. In the case of countries subjected to conditionality imposed by external institutions for the receipt of loans, the resultant harms have highlighted responsibility gaps across a range of international institutions. Two recent legal developments come together to expose these gaps: Greece's argument in a series of cases under the European Social Charter that it was not responsible for the impact on the right to social security brought about by austerity measures since it was only giving effect to its other international obligations as agreed with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the Troika), and the concern to emerge from the Pringle case before the European Court of Justice that European Union institutions could do outside of the EU that which they could not do within the EU-disregard the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the exercise of their tasks. That the Commission and ECB were in time answerable to international organisations set up to provide financial support adds an additional layer of responsibility to consider. Taking Greece as a case study and drawing on EU law, international human rights law, and the law on the international responsibility of states and of international organisations, this article looks to what we can expect in legal terms and as a matter of contemporary societal expectation when it comes to having international institutions respect human rights.

Access to Healthcare and the Global Financial Crisis in Italy: A Human Rights Perspective

“…Draconian austerity measures, thus, are threatening the enjoyment of the right to health in Italy. In effect, austerity measures can amount to deliberative retrogressive measures, potentially breaching a country's obligations in respecting the socioeconomic rights of its citizens (Bilchitz, 2014;Salomon, 2015).…”

Conditionality, Democracy and Institutional Weakness: the Euro‐crisis Trilemma

“…Rather, Greece had a right to the unilateral repudiation of the debt due to the absence of good faith, the violation of domestic laws, the precedence of human rights over other contractual obligations, the coercion in the debt restructuring, debt suspension on grounds of state necessity, and, ultimately, the right to unilateral sovereign insolvency (2015, pp. 58–62; see also Salomon, ). The work of the Committee was brought to a halt by the calling of the September elections and Zoe Konstantopoulou resigning from SYRIZA and joining the new Popular Unity party, led by Panagiotis Lafazanis.…”

The IMF Record on Social Protection: Pro‐poor or Poor?

“…Likewise, Robinson and Pfeiffer () note that, in the run‐up to the Ebola outbreak of 2015, Liberia and Sierra Leone had had to limit their recruitment of health workers and cap levels of pay to meet the expenditure limits within their IMF loan programmes. In relation to the Greek loans from 2010, Salomon () argues that IMF‐backed conditionality violated citizen rights to social security. As the IEO Report (p. 13) acknowledges, the IMF's focus on social protection in its lending arrangements is failing to meet observers’ expectations.…”