Of Tinfoil Hats and Thinking Caps: Reasoning is more strongly related to Implausible than Plausible Conspiracy Beliefs

Abstract

People who strongly endorse conspiracy theories typically exhibit biases in domain-general reasoning. Previous studies, however, have mostly focused on less plausible conspiracy theories (e.g., the moon landing was faked), rather than more plausible ones (e.g., the Russian Federation orchestrated the attack on Sergei Skripal). Here we examine whether reasoning biases are associated with belief in all conspiracy theories or only with belief in less plausible conspiracy theories. In two pre-registered studies, we found that endorsement of implausible conspiracy theories, but not plausible ones, was associated with reduced information sampling in an information-foraging task and with less reflective reasoning. Thus, the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and reasoning is not homogeneous, and reasoning is not linked specifically to the “conspiracy” in conspiracy theories, but to other factors (e.g., motivations towards sense making) that feature in many types of implausible belief (e.g., paranormal beliefs, delusions).