2001
DOI: 10.1080/09668130120093165
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Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy

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Cited by 17 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Conversely, states can also be guided by their ideal self based on inertia rather than intentional effort. For example, Russia's actions in the post-Soviet space during the early 1990s, such as support for separatist movements in the newly independent countries or its lacklustre commitment for regional initiatives, did not seem to be informed by an overarching strategy (Bukkvoll 2001).…”
Section: Perceptions Of the Self (Ideal Self) In World Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conversely, states can also be guided by their ideal self based on inertia rather than intentional effort. For example, Russia's actions in the post-Soviet space during the early 1990s, such as support for separatist movements in the newly independent countries or its lacklustre commitment for regional initiatives, did not seem to be informed by an overarching strategy (Bukkvoll 2001).…”
Section: Perceptions Of the Self (Ideal Self) In World Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The concepts and insights developed by Hirschman (1980) provide a useful starting point for conceptualising Ukraine's relations with Russia. From the very first days of its independence in 1991, these relations were dominated by a predicament: how to consolidate its independence in the context of an extensive economic dependence on Russia, which regarded Ukraine's independence as an aberration (Lester 1994;Kozakiewicz 1999;Bukkvoll 2001). On the one hand, upholding Ukraine's sovereignty was a key concern for Ukraine's elites, given that it was precarious and challenged (Wolczuk 2003, p. 28).…”
Section: Conceptualising Ukraine's Relations With Russiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Under his leadership, the Duma has been outspoken whenever the Russian government was perceived as recognising Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea (namely during negotiations of the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and during negotiations for the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet leasing, in 2010), or even when the Ukrainian government adopted measures which were perceived as limiting the rights of local ethnic Russians. 40 Zatulin sought to shape the Russian agenda towards Ukraine, supporting a view of a non-allied Ukraine, integrated into a common economic space with Russia, eventually federalised, and having Russian constitutionally recognised as a second language. 41 Similarly, the Moscow mayor -and one time presidential hopeful -Yurii Luzhkov has, since the mid-1990s, been an active supporter of nationalist issues, and Crimea has been a flagship issue in his political activities.…”
Section: From Lack Of Strategy To Limited Intervention: Russia-ukrainmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…41 Similarly, the Moscow mayor -and one time presidential hopeful -Yurii Luzhkov has, since the mid-1990s, been an active supporter of nationalist issues, and Crimea has been a flagship issue in his political activities. 42 Both Luzhkov and Zatulin have acted as policy entrepreneurs, providing support for local pro-Russian initiatives and keeping the nationalist issue of the ethnic Russians in Crimea on the Russian government agenda.…”
Section: From Lack Of Strategy To Limited Intervention: Russia-ukrainmentioning
confidence: 99%