Offensive Defensiveness: Toward an Integrative Neuroscience of Compensatory Zeal After Mortality Salience, Personal Uncertainty, and Other Poignant Self-Threats

McGregor, Ian

doi:10.1080/10478400701366977

Cited by 124 publications

(149 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…Historically, distressful economic situations have often preceded revolutions or electoral victories of extreme politicians. These observations are consistent with psychological theories and findings assuming a link between uncertainty and radicalization (McGregor, 2006; see also Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010;van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). Moreover, pessimistic economic views and low-income levels could be associated with conspiracy belief (Radnitz, 2012).…”

supporting

confidence: 76%

“…Somewhat paradoxically, uncertainty in one domain of life results in an increase of certainty, reflected in extreme convictions, in other (frequently political) domains (McGregor, 2006;McGregor & Marigold, 2003). Thus, political extremism is related to a structured way of thinking aimed at making sense of society and the way it functions.…”

Section: Conspiracy Beliefs and Extreme Political Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden

Krouwel¹,

Kutiyski²,

Prooijen

et al. 2017

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

101

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A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical political ideology, both left-and right-wing, tend to share similar underlying psychological patterns. By utilizing data collected through a voting advice application in Sweden, this study aims to assess whether extreme leftists and rightists share similarities in the psychological and political understanding of how society functions. We propose three hypotheses to test this pattern: Extreme left and right individuals are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories than moderates; they are more likely to have negative economic evaluations; and they are less politically and interpersonally trustful. By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, we find a similar linkage between ideology and economic evaluations. However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideology is related to lower political and interpersonal trust.Keywords: political ideology, economic evaluations, trust, conspiracy belief, extremism Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2017, Vol. 5(2), 435-462, doi:10.5964/jspp.v5i2.745 Received: 2016-12-08. Accepted: 2017-09-10. Published (VoR): 2017-10-28.Handling Editor: Małgorzata Kossowska, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland *Corresponding author at: Nieuwezijds Voorburgwal 334 2 1012 RW Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: andre.krouwel@vu.nl This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Throughout the 20 th century, radical political ideologies served as the propeller of tragic events that have left a deep mark in human history (Baumeister, 1997;Midlarsky, 2011). Movements of the radical right, such as Fascism and Nazism, were ideologically driven to commit unimaginable crimes against humanity which resulted in the death of millions. On the left, communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, as well as in numerous Asian countries were responsible for comparable atrocities. Even though there are substantial differences between these ideologies, political psychologists have noted that extreme left-and right-wing ideologies may share a similar underlying psychological pattern (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). In order to assess whether rigid devotion to extreme political ideology on both the left and the right corresponds to a similar psychological under- jspp.psychopen.eu | 2195-3325 standing of the world, it is necessary to compare radical individuals and test if their comprehension of the functioning of society is identical. Journal of Social and Political PsychologyAlthough extremist regimes of the past are in many ways hard to compare to political actors that are considered relatively extreme in the current politi...

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supporting

confidence: 76%

Section: Conspiracy Beliefs and Extreme Political Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden

Krouwel¹,

Kutiyski²,

Prooijen

et al. 2017

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…These studies raise significant questions about the mechanisms underlying dumbfounded responses to moral judgement tasks, but clearly indicate that such dumbfounded responses can be reliably elicited, and demonstrate interesting variability. Future research is needed to identify specific variables that may moderate dumbfounding; examples may include meaning maintenance and meaning threat (Heine et al, 2006;Proulx, & Inzlicht, 2012), need for closure (Kruglanski, 2013;Kruglanski, & Webster, 1996), or zeal (McGregor, 2006a(McGregor, , 2006bMcGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2012;McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). …”

Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Searching for Moral Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding

McHugh

McGann

Igou

et al. 2017

Collabra: Psychology

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Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral psychology. The present research examines the reliability with which dumbfounding can be elicited, and aims to identify measureable indicators of dumbfounding. Study 1 aimed at establishing the effect that is reported in the literature. Participants read four scenarios and judged the actions described. An Interviewer challenged participants' stated reasons for judgements. Dumbfounding was evoked, as measured by two indicators, admissions of not having reasons (17%), unsupported declarations (9%) with differences between scenarios. Study 2 measured dumbfounding as the selecting of an unsupported declaration as part of a computerised task. We observed high rates of dumbfounding across all scenarios. Studies 3a (college sample) and 3b (MTurk sample), addressing limitations in Study 2, replaced the unsupported declaration with an admission of having no reason, and included openended responses that were coded for unsupported declarations. As predicted, lower rates of dumbfounding were observed (3a 20%; 3b 16%; or 3a 32%; 3b 24% including unsupported declarations in open-ended responses). Two measures provided evidence for dumbfounding across three studies; rates varied with task type (interview/computer task), and with the particular measure being employed (admissions of not having reasons/unsupported declarations). Possible cognitive processes underlying dumbfounding and limitations of methodologies used are discussed as a means to account for this variability.

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“…Humans are meaning makings who seek to perceive stimuli (e.g., events, experiences) such that they see patterns even if they don't exist (Heine et al, 2006), ward of the perception of the unexpected (McGregor, 2006), and seek constancy in their environment (Bruner & Postman, 1949). Simply put, humans are driven to minimize uncertainty in their relational structures (Bruner & Postman, 1949;Heine et al, 2006;Yost et al, 1992) 2 .…”

Section: Meaning Making and Uncertainty Reductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meaning Making, Uncertainty Reduction, and Autobiographical Memory: A Replication and Reinterpretation of the TALE Questionnaire

Olivares¹

2012

PSYCH

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The present research was guided by two primary goals: 1) replicate the empirical structure of the Thinking about Life Experiences (TALE) questionnaire (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005); and 2) explore how the functions of autobiographical memory may interact and support one another. Toward the second goal, it is suggested that the potential functions of autobiographical memory may be understood from an existential framework that is grounded by two principles: humans are driven by a need for meaning and meaning is found in relation to others and other things in the world. In this pursuit of meaning making, and a desire to know what to expect from the world, humans seek to create a coherent set of relations among the various existential elements in their lives (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006); accordingly, humans strive to reduce uncertainty about the world and their place in it. As such, the TALE was reinterpreted using a relational framework and a 28-item self-report measure was developed. Participants completed the TALE and the reinterpreted TALE (RTALE). The results provide some support for the 3-factor structure of the TALE. The proposed 4-factor structure of the RTALE was supported.

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Offensive Defensiveness: Toward an Integrative Neuroscience of Compensatory Zeal After Mortality Salience, Personal Uncertainty, and Other Poignant Self-Threats

Cited by 124 publications

References 81 publications

Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden

Does extreme political ideology predict conspiracy beliefs, economic evaluations and political trust? Evidence from Sweden

Searching for Moral Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding

Meaning Making, Uncertainty Reduction, and Autobiographical Memory: A Replication and Reinterpretation of the TALE Questionnaire

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