Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict

Abstract

Oil-exporting states, or petrostates, engage in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) at a much higher rate on average than nonpetrostates. Why is this so? Further, what explains the variation among the petrostates in adopting aggressive foreign policies and engaging in MIDs on that basis? This article develops a theory that proposes that revolutionary petrostates have a higher propensity to launch MIDs than comparable nonpetrostates. This theory is tested with statistical analysis using a new quantitative data set that identifies revolutionary governments in the period 1945–2001. The results show that petro-revolutionary governments constitute a special threat to international peace and security. This evidence of resource-backed aggression challenges the conventional view of petrostates as the targets of international competition for resources.

Fossil Fuel Rents: Who Initiates International Crises?

“…In these markets the damage of the fuels revenues is ultimately small because there are no many alternative gas exporters in the market and because there is very little need for coal imports. Therefore, "the resource backed aggression" (Colgan, 2010) is reversed to "market restricted behavior" and thus, pacifier's behavior for fossil-fuel states of an oligopolistic market (i.e., oil).…”

Global Oil Industry Conflict: An Apocalyptic End?

“…Oil income has its most negative consequences for international peace when it flows into a state that is led by a government with aggressive preferences. Such leadership often arises in the wake of a domestic political revolution (Colgan, 2010, p. 679).…”

“…In non-petro-states, one of the reasons that leaders tend to avoid international conflicts is because they know that if they are defeated, they are incredibly prone to be overthrown from office, either peacefully or violently. Yet a leader with huge financial resources to redistribute and purchase political support can afford to take chances, counting those concerned with belligerent foreign policy adventurism (Colgan, 2010, p. 680).…”

“…Secondly, revolutions tend to eliminate domestic political constraints that might otherwise restrain an aggressive leader from taking a state into conflict or war. Thus, revolutionary states have a higher propensity for aggression than comparable non-revolutionary states, regardless of whether they have oil (Colgan, 2010, p.681). 10 Oil income is easily controlled by the central government, thereby giving the leader an independent source of financial resources that can be redistributed to buy political support For states in which a revolutionary government has taken power, oil amplifies the state's propensity to instigate international conflicts.…”

“…Thus, revolutionary states have a higher propensity for aggression than comparable non-revolutionary states, regardless of whether they have oil (Colgan, 2010, p.681). 10 Oil income is easily controlled by the central government, thereby giving the leader an independent source of financial resources that can be redistributed to buy political support For states in which a revolutionary government has taken power, oil amplifies the state's propensity to instigate international conflicts. The combination of a risktolerant revolutionary leader, financial resources for armed actions, and a lofty scale of political selfsufficiency generated by oil earnings, produces a noxious mix that aids state aggression, which in turn leads to conflict.…”