2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.03.004
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Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

Abstract: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.

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Cited by 198 publications
(91 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
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“…Quinn (2008:84), for example, finds that "majority state ownership of the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption." This finding is corroborated by Arezki and Brückner (2011), who show that oil rents have a positive effect on corruption only in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production.…”
Section: Resource Ownership Patterns and Intrastate Conflictsupporting
confidence: 78%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Quinn (2008:84), for example, finds that "majority state ownership of the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption." This finding is corroborated by Arezki and Brückner (2011), who show that oil rents have a positive effect on corruption only in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production.…”
Section: Resource Ownership Patterns and Intrastate Conflictsupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Arezki and Brückner (2011) argue that in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production, oil rents have a significant effect on corruption, and there is no threat to state stability. In addition to the possibility of buying the consent of key segments of society, large oil rents are often used to increase states' military and counterinsurgency capacities.…”
Section: Review Of the Research On Natural Resources Domestic Stabilmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There have been several empirical cross-country analyses (using regression analysis) demonstrating a strong negative correlation between mineral resources and several institutional variables (e.g. for corruption, see Arezki and Brückner, 2011;Leite and Weidmann, 2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009;Norman, 2009;Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler andBulte, 2008, Isham et al, 2005; for property rights protection see Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010;Brunnschweiler, 2008, for transparency see Williams, 2011).…”
Section: Institutions (As Dependent Variable)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We estimate the conditional mean of transformed gross FDI as a function of all 12 measures of institutional quality. Although this conditional mean is likely over-specified (with too many right-hand-side variables given the available sample 16 The aggregate ICRG political risk index has also been used in a relatively large number of papers (e.g., Albuquerque, 2003;Alfaro et al, 2008;Okada, 2013;Papaioannou, 2009;Reinhardt et al, 2013), and various ICRG subcomponents have been widely used in examinations of other dimensions of political risk (e.g., Arezki and Brückner, 2011;Hakkala et al, 2008;Li, 2009). 17 We re-estimated each empirical model reported below using WGI data, which led to no qualitative differences in the main results.…”
Section: Indices Measuring Institutional Quality and Political Risksmentioning
confidence: 99%