Old wine in new casks: libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles

Abstract

Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is "liberty-preserving" and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people's liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people's values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles-and thus, there is no categorical difference between "libertarian" and other forms of paternalism.

The Institutional Consequences of Nudging – Nudges, Politics, and the Law

“…Critics such as Hausman and Welch (2010) warn us that Bshaping people's choices for their own benefit seems to us to be alarmingly intrusive^(p. 131), and are concerned that certain instances of nudging exploit human weakness. Some investigate whether or not nudging violates liberal principles (Grüne-Yanoff 2012), or look at how nudges impact the Bfundamental rights of citizens to freedom of expression, privacy, and self-determination^ (Alemanno and Spina 2014, p. 431). Others respond to these concerns by modifying the concept of nudging (Saghai 2013), but abstain from considering institutional implications of their rescue attempts.…”

From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond

“…Various authors have pointed out that in practice, nudge applications rarely follow this interpretation of private welfare as the satisfaction of true preferences (FatehMoghadam and Gutmann 2013;Grüne-Yanoff 2012;Rebonato 2012;Rizzo and Whitman 2009). A libertarian paternalistic planner faces a knowledge problem when attempting to identify people's true preferences.…”

The rise and fall of the ‘nudge’ of minimum unit pricing: The continuity of neoliberalism in alcohol policy in England

“…Other objections are political -that the 'nudge' is inconsistent with the key Coalition aim of 'empowering' citizens (Goodwin, 2012) or that the nudging is not, as Thaler and Sunstein describe it, a form of 'libertarian paternalism' because the initiatives do not fit with either word (Amir and Lobel, 2012;Grüne-Yanoff, 2012). Grüne-Yanoff suggests that instances of the second type might be considered manipulation -and therefore inconsistent with orthodox liberal philosophy -because (if they are to be effective) they cannot be entirely transparent (see also Bovens, 2008).…”