A noncooperative model of a normal form game is developed using tools from fuzzy set theory. The paper extends the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. We identify conditions for the existence of equilibrium in this setting and provide a duopoly example. The paper also provides a review of the existing literature on noncooperative fuzzy games and their applications.
JEL Classification: C7, D8Keywords: Noncooperative games, Fuzzy sets. * We would like thank Hans Haller, Rob Gilles, two annonymous referees and the Editor for helpful suggestions. All errors, omissions and misinterpretations are our responsibility.
AbstractA noncooperative model of a normal form game is developed using tools from fuzzy set theory. The paper extends the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. We identify conditions for the existence of equilibrium in this setting and provide a duopoly example. The paper also provides a review of the existing literature on noncooperative fuzzy games and their applications.