2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2630664
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Oligopoly Competition in Continuous Time

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Although the literature above predicts full cooperation, a simple extension of a one-shot game predicts that cooperation would not exist, whereas an extended Folk Theorem gives broad predictions with differing degrees of cooperation. Empirically, the experiments of Horstmann et al (2015) find reduced cooperation in continuous time, in direct contrast to the results of Friedman and Oprea (2012). Their work, however, finds that an increase in the number of players substantially reduces cooperation, and is therefore consistent with the findings of the PD, Cournot and Bertrand literature cited above.…”
Section: Collusive Playsupporting
confidence: 64%
“…Although the literature above predicts full cooperation, a simple extension of a one-shot game predicts that cooperation would not exist, whereas an extended Folk Theorem gives broad predictions with differing degrees of cooperation. Empirically, the experiments of Horstmann et al (2015) find reduced cooperation in continuous time, in direct contrast to the results of Friedman and Oprea (2012). Their work, however, finds that an increase in the number of players substantially reduces cooperation, and is therefore consistent with the findings of the PD, Cournot and Bertrand literature cited above.…”
Section: Collusive Playsupporting
confidence: 64%