Omniscience and Immutability

Kretzmann, Norman

doi:10.2307/2023849

Cited by 78 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…As it is known, classically, there is largely a consensus within theist tradition that God is both all-knowing and immutable. However, in the contemporary philosophy of religion, with the article "Omniscience and Immutability" by N. Kretzmann, it has been generally stated that these two attributes are incompatible (Kretzmann 1966). His argument is essentially based on the claim that a God who knows the flow in the universe cannot be immutable.…”

Section: Can God Know Tensed Facts?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Omniscience, Immutability and Tensed Facts in Avicenna and Al-Ghazâlî

Tanış¹

2021

Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences

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Section: Can God Know Tensed Facts?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Omniscience, Immutability and Tensed Facts in Avicenna and Al-Ghazâlî

Tanış¹

2021

Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences

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“…God may create and so ground some physical environment and this environment may ground my de se knowledge of some proposition; as a result, God may ground my de se knowledge. But on the reasonable assumption that (a) God cannot create what He cannot know and that (b) God cannot know my de se knowledge (Kretzmann (1966), 420–421), it follows that God cannot create my de se knowledge 12 . Of course, the success of a non-causal account will depend on more detailed proposals than those I just sketched.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theistic modal realism and causal modal collapse

Maia

2020

Rel. Stud.

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Theistic modal realism argues for an extension of Lewis's modal realism capable of accommodating a theistic God. By affording elegant solutions to many atheistic challenges, the view is of great theoretical utility for the theist. However, it has been objected that within a Lewisian framework God cannot be causally efficacious on pain of collapsing intuitively distinct modal notions. In this article I explain why these worries are ill-founded and show how God's existence and causal power over the pluriverse can be consistently understood. If successful, the proposal offers a congenial theistic way to adopt modal realism and address the atheological problems.

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“…4.There is disagreement among philosophers whether such an understanding of maximal propositional knowledge is consistent with divine simplicity. For more on the nature of this disagreement, see Kretzmann (1966) and Brentano (1976). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does God know what it's like not to know?

Lovering

2012

Rel. Stud.

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The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge (both to be defined shortly)? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not. Key concepts and assumptionsThe key concepts of this article are propositional knowledge, experiential knowledge, and omniscience. Each will be discussed in turn. (2013) 49, 85-99 Religious Studies

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Omniscience and Immutability

Cited by 78 publications

References 0 publications

Omniscience, Immutability and Tensed Facts in Avicenna and Al-Ghazâlî

Omniscience, Immutability and Tensed Facts in Avicenna and Al-Ghazâlî

Theistic modal realism and causal modal collapse

Does God know what it's like not to know?

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