On a puzzle about relations between thought, experience and the motoric

Abstract

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Are We “Motorically” Wired to Others? High-Level Motor Computations and Their Role in Autism

“…Thus, the extraction, codification, and therefore translation of “external” social cues (e.g., other’s movement, other’s action or other’s gaze, see Becchio and others 2007; J Cook and others 2014) into the motor system seems to be impaired in ASD, or at least anomalous (Parma and others 2013; Casartelli and Parma, 2017). Second, motor resonance mechanisms entail a (motor) matching between observed and executed actions, by virtue of the transformation of “external” sensory information (e.g., visual or auditory) into “internal” motor representation (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010; Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2015). Thus, others’ action and intentionality can be figured out not only using complex metacognitive and inferential processes, but also in a direct, pre-cognitive, and motor way (i.e., action and intention understanding “from the inside”; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010).…”

Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention

“…But it is plausible that the mental states guiding skilled action represent not just goals, but also means to achieve the goals. Accounting for how intentions may include both propositionally and motorically formatted representations of means is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, but in my view Sinigaglia and Butterfill's () discussion of the use of imagery offers interesting material for reflection. In particular, in thinking about how an agent manages to actively guide the way that she achieves some goal, I would emphasize an agent's ability to combine perceptual, motoric, and proprioceptive imagery into coherent movement profiles that could set parameters for action guidance and the detection of error at relatively fine‐grained levels.…”

“… For a different (but I think ultimately congenial) discussion of a role for consciousness in solving the interface problem, see Sinigaglia and Butterfill (). …”

Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity

“…7 Recent discussion of the relation between prior intentions and intentions-in-action has centred around a two-tier framework, in which a more primitive minimalist system runs partly independently of a slower, more purposeful, cognitive system that is conscious and propositional. This discussion has involved, inter alia, an account of how primitive agents (animals or infants) might be able to engage in joint actions via shared goals in the absence of the former (Butterfill 2012(Butterfill , 2013; and how the more complex system-2 might interface with the more primitive system-1 (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014;Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2015). See Christensen and Michael (2016) for a critical discussion of this proposal.…”