On a spontaneous decentralized market process

Fujishige, Satoru; Yang, Zaifu

doi:10.22574/jmid.2017.12.001

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…The interested reader may refer to Chen et al. (2016), Fujishige and Yang (2017), Kojima and Ünver (2008), and Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for different random market processes.…”

Section: Existence Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core

Fujishige

Yang

2021

Bulletin of Econ Res

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We study a general barter market where every agent is endowed with several heterogeneous indivisible items and wishes to exchange. There is no medium of exchange like money. Agents have general preferences over their interested bundles of items and may acquire several items. We propose a practical and sensible solution called a Markovian core, generalizing the classical notion of the core. A Markovian core allocation is individually rational, Pareto‐efficient, and stable against any coalition deviation by comparison with their current assignments instead of their initial endowments and is shown to be a natural outcome of a decentralized market process.

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“…The interested reader may refer to Chen et al. (2016), Fujishige and Yang (2017), Kojima and Ünver (2008), and Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for different random market processes.…”

Section: Existence Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core

Fujishige

Yang

2021

Bulletin of Econ Res

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“…The main difference to the markets we consider is that agents leave the market once they match. This strand of work is thus concerned with analyzing the trade-off between matching in the current period and foregoing potentially better matches in the future versus the search cost incurred by remaining in the market (usually represented by discounting future profits).3 A series of related papers studies similar processes for one-sided markets(Andersson et al, 2014;Biró et al, 2014) and markets where firms can hire multiple workers(Nax and Pradelski, 2016;Fujishige…”

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confidence: 99%

The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets

Leshno

Pradelski

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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We study the dynamics of price discovery in decentralized two-sided markets.We show that there exist memoryless dynamics that converge to the core of the underlying assignment game in which agents' actions depend only on their current payoff. However, we show that for any such dynamic the convergence time can grow exponentially in relation to the population size. We present a natural dynamic in which a player's reservation value provides a summary of his past information and show that this dynamic converges to the core in polynomial time in homogeneous markets.

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“… The main result of Chen et al (), incorporated into Chen et al (), is the convergence of blocking paths to competitive equilibrium , which is stronger than stability. See also Fujishige and Yang (). …”

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confidence: 99%

Learning by matching

Chen

2020

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This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea that the absence of rematching conveys no further information. When an allocation is not stable under the status quo information structure, a new pair of an allocation and an information structure will be derived. We show that starting from an arbitrary allocation and an arbitrary information structure, the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to rematch, accompanied by information updating, will converge with probability one to an allocation that is stable under the updated information structure. Our results are robust with respect to various alternative learning patterns.

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On a spontaneous decentralized market process

Cited by 6 publications

References 67 publications

Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core

Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core

The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets

Learning by matching

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