On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage

Savitt, Steven F.

doi:10.1017/s1358246100010559

Cited by 26 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Becoming is not something that happens over and above a 4d pseudoriemanniann general relativistic geometry: it is what a 4d pseudo-riemanniann general relativistic geometry describes. (See also [28,29].) As Donald C. Williams puts it in his appropriately celebrated article 'The Myth of Passage' [30]:…”

Section: B Becomingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neither Presentism nor Eternalism

Rovelli

2019

Found Phys

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Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and becoming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.

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Section: B Becomingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neither Presentism nor Eternalism

Rovelli

2019

Found Phys

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“…This view of the B-theory and its relation to transition is unusual, but not without defenders (e.g. Savitt 2002); I defend it in detail elsewhere 1 . I argue that the reason we can take succession to be itself dynamic is that there are limitations to how deeply transition, and dynamicity, can be conceptualised by any metaphysical theory, whether A-or B-theoretic.…”

Section: Williams's First Claim: Transition and The B-theorymentioning

confidence: 95%

‘Beyond A- and B-Time’ Reconsidered

Deng

2010

Philosophia

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This article is a response to Clifford Williams's claim that the debate between A-and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams's claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A-versus B debate.

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“…25 22 Whereas I take pure becoming to underlie the transience of temporal reality and, thus, to be the fundamental notion in a comprehensive account of the metaphysics of time, it does not play such a role in Broad's philosophy of time. 23 The notion is discussed in Savitt (2002). Savitt and I interpret Broad very differently.…”

Section: Pure Becoming and The Transience Of Temporal Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Passage, Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality

Fiocco

2007

Philosophia

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I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account -in terms of change -is irredeemably problematic. And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the world.Keywords Time . The metaphysics of time . Passage . Becoming Preliminary Metaphysical Distinctions and ObjectivesIt seems beyond credible doubt that time exists and that the very presence of time in the world has certain effects on the way the world is. Temporal reality is, collectively, those marks upon the world that arise specifically as a consequence of the existence of time. An account of these marks, considered at the most general and elementary level, is a metaphysical account of the nature of temporal reality. The philosopher of time, then, might endeavor to provide an account -a theory -of the nature of time itself or of temporal reality or of some particular feature of either. A theory of the nature of time itself would provide answers to the questions of what time is and which properties this thing that is time has. A different kind of theoryone regarding the nature of temporal reality -would furnish answers to the question of how the world is as a consequence of the existence of time. These two types of theories are independent of one another. As explained below, a particular theory of time need not have any consequences for a theory of temporal reality (and vice versa).

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On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage

Cited by 26 publications

References 3 publications

Neither Presentism nor Eternalism

Neither Presentism nor Eternalism

‘Beyond A- and B-Time’ Reconsidered

Passage, Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality

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