On Alethic Disjunctivism

Abstract

Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each of the domain‐specific properties as disjuncts (i.e., in the view's simplest form, truth is the property of either having domain‐specific property 1, or domain‐specific property 2, and so on). This paper evaluates the prospects for alethic disjunctivism. In particular, it outlines the proper formulation of the view, and assesses some concerns that the disjunctive property lacks the pedigree necessary to be considered a truth property. I begin by briefly outlining the motivations for alethic pluralism, before noting four general constraints on formulations of the view. I then consider a ‘simple’ formulation of alethic disjunctivism, and recommend an amendment. I then demonstrate that the candidate truth property specified by this new formulation is able to meet the central constraints required for it to be considered a viable formulation of alethic pluralism. The final part of this demonstration involves making some distinctions between different kinds of disjunctive properties, and arguing that disjunctive properties are not necessarily highly abundant properties: some are more sparse than others.

Alethic Pluralism, Logical Validity, and Natural Truth

“…Some observations in a similar spirit can also be found in Lynch (2009, p. 126-127). See also Edwards (2012). 26 See Lynch (2009), Pedersen and Wright (2013), Edwards (2012Edwards ( , 2018.…”

“…See also Edwards (2012). 26 See Lynch (2009), Pedersen and Wright (2013), Edwards (2012Edwards ( , 2018. characterize a role that area specific truth property play, a general property they manifest, or a general property they determine.…”

Recent work on alethic pluralism

“…One answers to a deflationary truth concept, the other to an inflationary one. The deflationary concept is characterized just by the disquotational schema ("p" is true if and only p), while the deflationary concept is characterized by the disquotational schema in conjunction with a 1 Other authors who mention the scope problem include Barnard and Horgan (2006, forthcoming), Edwards (2011Edwards ( , 2012, Pedersen (2006Pedersen ( , 2010, Sher (1998Sher ( , 2004Sher ( , 2005, Wright (2005, forthcoming). Edwards (forthcoming b) discusses the problem in connection with representationalist theories of truth.…”

“…Their preferred labels may nonetheless be thought to carry this suggestion. For this reason I speak of core principles instead.5 The formulation used here is the regimented version suggested by David (forthcoming) Edwards (2011Edwards ( , 2012,. forthcoming a), Pedersen (2012),Pedersen and Edwards (2011), and Pedersen and Wright (forthcoming b) likewise rely on a network analysis.…”

TRUTH AS ONE(S) AND MANY: ON LYNCH'S ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM1

“…14 14 For more on alethic disjunctivism, see Pedersen (2006, 2010, forthcoming) and Pedersen and Wright (2012). Furthermore, see Cotnoir (2009, p. 478) and Edwards (forthcoming). …”