On Attack Mitigation in Supervisory Control Systems: A Tolerant Control Approach

Yao, Jingshi; Yin, Xiang; Li, Shaoyuan

doi:10.1109/cdc42340.2020.9304130

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…, S u−1 for G (if they exist) as well as the minimum cost index i min . Each supervisor is computed by the UCC function (lines [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24], and provides a different control policy such that every string reaching secret states has at least one controllable event of (security) level at v. So in total, S 0 , . .…”

Section: Policy Computation For Uscpmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This status change is done by event relabeling. Specifically, let G j = (Q, Σ j = Σ uc,j ∪Σ c,j , δ j , q 0 , Q m ) be the jth system model and D j be the control policy in (18) corresponding to supervisor S j . Then the set of controllable transitions specified (or disabled) by D j is…”

Section: Policy Computation For Uscpmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another well studied problem is fault-tolerance and attack-resilience (e.g. [14,15,16,17,18]). This is a design requirement that a supervisory controller should remain (reasonably) operational even after faults occur in the system or the system is undre malicious attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Usability Aware Secret Protection with Minimum Cost

Matsui

Cai

2021

Preprint

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In this paper we study a cybersecurity problem of protecting system's secrets with multiple protections and a required security level, while minimizing the associated cost due to implementation/maintenance of these protections as well as the affected system usability. The target system is modeled as a discrete-event system (DES) in which there are a subset of marker states denoting the services/functions provided to regular users, a subset of secret states, and multiple subsets of protectable events with different security levels. We first introduce usability-aware cost levels for the protectable events, and then formulate the security problem as to ensure that every system trajectory that reaches a secret state contains a specified number of protectable events with at least a certain security level, and the highest usability-aware cost level of these events is minimum. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which this security problem is solvable, and when this condition holds we propose an algorithm to solve the problem based on the supervisory control theory of DES. Moreover, we extend the problem to the case of heterogeneous secrets with different levels of importance, and develop an algorithm to solve this extended problem. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our solutions with a network security example.

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Section: Policy Computation For Uscpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Policy Computation For Uscpmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Usability Aware Secret Protection with Minimum Cost

Matsui

Cai

2021

Preprint

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“…(Email: ruochen001@e.ntu.edu.sg; llin5@e.ntu.edu.sg; rsu@ntu.edu.sg). (Corresponding author: Liyong Lin) attackers from eavesdropping and intercepting secret information, 4) embedding the mitigation module to disable events that can be defended [11], 5) designing transition protecting policies against an external intruder, which could delay the event firings, to guarantee that the makespan of the requirement does not drop below a given deadline [12], 6) synthesizing secret protection strategies such that any event sequence from the initial state that reaches a secret state contains a number of protected events no less than a given threshold [13], [14], and 7) synthesizing liveness-enforcing supervisors against attacks [15]. This paper would continue our previous work [9] on the study of supervisor obfuscation problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supervisor Obfuscation Against Covert Actuator Attackers

Tai¹,

Lin²,

Shi³

2022

Preprint

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This work investigates the problem of synthesizing obfuscated supervisors against covert actuator attackers. For a non-resilient supervisor S, for which there exist some covert actuator attackers that are capable of inflicting damage, we propose an algorithm to compute all the obfuscated supervisors, with the requirements that: 1) any obfuscated supervisor S is resilient against any covert actuator attacker, and 2) the original closed-behavior of the closed-loop system under S is preserved, that is, any obfuscated supervisor S is control equivalent to the original non-resilient supervisor S. We prove that the designed algorithm to synthesize obfuscated supervisors against covert actuator attack is sound and complete.

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“…Regarding fault modeling, it is important to mention that is a more complete modeling of the system, even if the faults are not detectable. The above direction is becoming more and more necessary in industry 4.0 manufacturing systems, not only because faults affect the productivity and safety of the system but also due to the strong correlation and common control strategies required for fault detection, fault tolerance control, and handling of cyber-attacks, indicatively see [ 19 , 20 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modular Supervisory Control for the Coordination of a Manufacturing Cell with Observable Faults

Kouvakas

Koumboulis

Fragkoulis

et al. 2022

Sensors

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In the present paper, a manufacturing cell in the presence of faults, coming from the devices of the process, is considered. The modular modeling of the subsystems of the cell is accomplished using of appropriate finite deterministic automata. The desired functionality of the cell as well as appropriate safety specifications are formulated as eleven desired languages. The desired languages are expressed as regular expressions in analytic forms. The languages are realized in the form of appropriate general type supervisor forms. Using these forms, a modular supervisory design scheme is accomplished providing satisfactory performance in the presence of faults as well guaranteeing the safety requirements. The aim of the present supervisor control scheme is to achieve tolerance of basic characteristics of the process coordination to upper-level faults, despite the presence of low-level faults in the devices of the process. The complexity of the supervisor scheme is computed.

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On Attack Mitigation in Supervisory Control Systems: A Tolerant Control Approach

Cited by 16 publications

References 23 publications

Usability Aware Secret Protection with Minimum Cost

Usability Aware Secret Protection with Minimum Cost

Supervisor Obfuscation Against Covert Actuator Attackers

Modular Supervisory Control for the Coordination of a Manufacturing Cell with Observable Faults

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