On balanced games and games with committee control

Curiel, Imma; Derks, Jean; Tijs, S.H.

doi:10.1007/bf01746002

Cited by 38 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The decision model which is studied here is rather similar to models used in the area of "linear production games" (Owen, 1975;Kalai & Zemel, 1982;Curiel et al, 1989;Fernandez et al, 2003). These games are based on a standard linear production model.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Manipulation of Preference Information in Multi-Criteria Group Decision Methods

Vetschera

2005

Group Decis Negot

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When group decisions involve the allocation of resources to group members, the members might have an incentive to strategically distort any information they provide to increase their share of resources. The paper compares several simple multi-criteria group decision methods with respect to this problem. We show, using a computational model, that strategic manipulation of preference information is possible in all of the methods, although to a different extent. Furthermore, when the true solution generated by this methods is not Pareto-optimal, manipulation attempts might even improve the efficiency of outcomes.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Manipulation of Preference Information in Multi-Criteria Group Decision Methods

Vetschera

2005

Group Decis Negot

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“…is the simple game with player i as dictator for each к G {l,...,p} and each i G {l,...,<7fc = n}; <ñ = dj(i) and uj is the simple game with player i as dictator for each j G {l,...,r} and г G {l,...,hj = η}. A linear programming game with committee control need not be balanced as the following example from Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1987) shows.…”

Section: {S) and Dj(s) = σ%ι D 4 Ju 4 J{s) Such That V(s) = Vp(ahbmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These claim games turn out to be convex and therefore balanced and with the aid of core elements of the claim games a core element for the linear programming game with claims is constructed. Section 3 of this chapter is partly based on Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1987) and section 4 is based on work done in Curiel et al (1988a).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Game Theory and Applications

Curiel

1997

Theory and Decision Library

150

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“…Granot (1986) introduces another generalization in which the resources owned by a coalition are not restricted to be the sum of the resources of players in the coalition. Curiel et al (1989) introduce LP games with committee control, obtaining results on the balancedness of these games, whose core has been more recently studied by Molina and Tejada (2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

Perea¹,

Puerto²,

Fernández³

2012

European Journal of Operational Research

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This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-know solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that, in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original linear production process. In this paper a new solution set named EOwen is introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to such player.

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On balanced games and games with committee control

Abstract: On balanced games and games with committee controlCuriel, I.; Derks, J.; Tijs, S.H.

Cited by 38 publications

References 7 publications

Strategic Manipulation of Preference Information in Multi-Criteria Group Decision Methods

Strategic Manipulation of Preference Information in Multi-Criteria Group Decision Methods

Cooperative Game Theory and Applications

Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

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