On Being Happy or Unhappy

Abstract

The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person's emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this "emotional state" view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness' value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well-being, as it is in L. W. Sumner's work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well-being. The emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well-being than is generally recognized.Happiness in intelligent people is the rarest thing I know.

What happiness science can learn from John Stuart Mill

“…Hedonism as a theory of wellbeing additionally holds that wellbeing is constituted by happiness. This latter view is particularly controversial in philosophy 7 , but as a view about happiness, hedonism is quite popular (see Haybron, 2005). Bentham, as well as Mill, held both views of hedonism, but for the present purpose we will focus on hedonism as a view on the nature of happiness.…”

“…Another recently developed view maintains that happiness is an emotional state quality (Haybron, 2005). According to Daniel Haybron, happiness is not an experiential state, but describes our emotional state.…”

Central Park: Nature, context, and human wellbeing

“…Similarly, the finding that valuing material success may reduce happiness has little or no bearing on whether material success itself reduces happiness (Kasser 2002). 11 I defend an emotional state theory of happiness in Haybron 2005 andHaybron 2008. 12 Ulrich 1984.…”

Mood Propensity as a Constituent of Happiness: A Rejoinder to Hill

“…The claim is significant for several reasons, one being that it may form part of a plausible account of well-being. (Haybron 2005(Haybron , 2008a. Note that this is not a trivial claim, since 'happiness' in this debate serves as a purely descriptive psychological term and not a synonym for 'well-being' or 'eudaimonia'.…”

“…(Though, as I argue elsewhere, these concerns differ from those driving our interest in happiness. See Haybron 2001b, 2005, 2008b.) Once you abandon the hedonistic rationale for your theory by embracing an emotional state view, you need a way to decide which states count and which don't.…”