On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

Abstract

In the theory of congestion games, the Braess' paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative gametheoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.

Matrix completion of world trade: An analysis of interpretability through Shapley values

“…Another research direction-still related to computational issues-is to use appropriate machine learning techniques to predict Shapley values, as outlined by Passacantando et al (2021b) in another context (in which Shapley values were used to study the significance of arcs in graphs). In this way, approximate values for the Shapley values could be found, allowing the present analysis to be extended to larger data sets in future extensions.…”