2018
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.12205
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On Cryptographic Attacks Using Backdoors for SAT

Abstract: Propositional satisfiability (SAT) is at the nucleus of state-of-the-art approaches to a variety of computationally hard problems, one of which is cryptanalysis. Moreover, a number of practical applications of SAT can only be tackled efficiently by identifying and exploiting a subset of formula's variables called backdoor set (or simply backdoors). This paper proposes a new class of backdoor sets for SAT used in the context of cryptographic attacks, namely guess-and-determine attacks. The idea is to identify t… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Although these methodologies to design the structures of S-boxes offer favorable characteristics, researchers have also pointed out the weaknesses of these approaches 42 . Many statistical attacks are available for the assembly of S-box designs, including linear and differential [43][44][45] , interpolation 46 , Grobner basis 47 , side-channel 48 , SAT solver 49 , XL 50 , and XSL 51 attacks. Chaos-based systems have been used extensively in the construction of confusion components 52,53 , but owing to the inherent algorithmic advancement of control parameters and periodicity in the maps, several weaknesses of these systems also exist in the literature, including discontinuity and non-uniform distribution in chaotic sequences 54,55 , predictability 56,57 , finite precision effect and short quantity of randomness 58,59 , dynamical degradation of chaotic systems and frail chaos 60,61 , and a small number of control parameters 62,63 .…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although these methodologies to design the structures of S-boxes offer favorable characteristics, researchers have also pointed out the weaknesses of these approaches 42 . Many statistical attacks are available for the assembly of S-box designs, including linear and differential [43][44][45] , interpolation 46 , Grobner basis 47 , side-channel 48 , SAT solver 49 , XL 50 , and XSL 51 attacks. Chaos-based systems have been used extensively in the construction of confusion components 52,53 , but owing to the inherent algorithmic advancement of control parameters and periodicity in the maps, several weaknesses of these systems also exist in the literature, including discontinuity and non-uniform distribution in chaotic sequences 54,55 , predictability 56,57 , finite precision effect and short quantity of randomness 58,59 , dynamical degradation of chaotic systems and frail chaos 60,61 , and a small number of control parameters 62,63 .…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As mentioned earlier, chaos-and algebraic-based techniques are extensively used to design the confusion component. Chaos-and algebraic-based techniques provide favorable features for the design of confusion components; however, researchers have also identified various cryptanalysis on these techniques including interpolation attacks [9][10][11][12], Gröbner basis attack [13][14][15][16][17][18][19], SAT solver [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27], linear and differential attacks [28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42], XL attacks [43][44][45], and XSL attack [9,[46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55]. Similarly, ...…”
Section: Attacks On Confusion Component Design Schemesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, the main objective of the linear attack is to try to learn the linear association between the parity bits of cipher text, plaintext, and the symmetric key. Responsibility to make the correlation between ciphertext and the key, as undetectable as possible, is only on the confusion component, as well as resistance against the cryptanalysis attacks totally depends upon the confusion component [13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The problem of evaluating the decomposition hardness in (Semenov et al 2021) was reduced to the optimization of the pseudo-Boolean black-box function, which was carried out using evolutionary algorithms. In (Semenov et al 2018), a special class of backdoor sets was introduced that enables one to estimate the hardness of cryptographic guessand-determine attacks (Bard 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%