On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng

doi:10.1111/ecin.12907

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Whereas these two studies assume that players' ordering is fixed, we focus on the ordering of teams in the dynamics. In this sense, our study is closely related to the article by Fu and Lu (2020). Different to their model, however, we study teams' performance in a multi-tasking environment in which teams can choose both their defending and attacking efforts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

First home or first away? Optimal ordering in two‐legged ties

Jost

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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We model a two‐legged tie between two teams as a two‐stage contest where each team chooses its attacking and defending effort for each leg. Assuming that each team has a home advantage for one of the matches, we analyze teams' preferences of order of play under different tiebreaking rules. We show that the answer depends on the size of the home advantage, the relative strengths of both teams, and the tiebreaking rule. In particular, we identify under which conditions a team prefers to play first home or first away and under which conditions they are indifferent.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

First home or first away? Optimal ordering in two‐legged ties

Jost

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…These two papers assume that the matching of players is pre…xed, but Barbieri and Serena (2019) also consider a contest-design problem and show that the sequential game in which players are ordered from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient is the setup that minimizes winners'e¤orts. Fu and Lu (2018) consider a strategic player assignment game in a two-team, two-stage, all-pay contest, in which each team has one stronger and one weaker player. This model has the closest motivation to ours, but there is a fundamental di¤erence between the two.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles

Konishi

Pan

Simeonov

2022

Games and Economic Behavior

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We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battle…eld in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015 American Economic Review). We consider one-shot orderchoice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected e¤ort of each player in a multi-battle contest are independent of whether players' assignments are one-shot or battle-by-battle sequential. This equilibrium winning probability and ex ante expected total e¤ort coincide with those where the player matching is chosen totally randomly with an equal probability lottery by the contest organizer. Finally, we show how player choices add subtleties to the equivalence result by examples.We thank Stefano Barbieri, Qiang Fu, and Jingfeng Lu for their helpful comments and encouragement. Comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee and associate editor improved the paper tremendously.

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Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts

Arbatskaya

Konishi

2023

Rev Econ Design

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In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams generating impacts according to the Cobb-Douglas e¤ort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium e¤orts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests with complementary e¤orts.

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On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

Cited by 7 publications

References 51 publications

First home or first away? Optimal ordering in two‐legged ties

First home or first away? Optimal ordering in two‐legged ties

Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles

Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts

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