On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning

Lempert, Daniel

doi:10.3917/redp.283.0423

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 66 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Therefore, during the evolutionary process, the participating subjects change their own state in order to choose the optimal strategy, learn continuously, and then choose the optimal strategy to keep the system in a stable state. It is solved by calculating the payoff functions of the game subjects to construct the replicated dynamic equations of multiple parties, and solving the optimal equilibrium points under different evolutionary paths via the Jacobi matrix [29].…”

Section: Model Assumptions and Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Paths for the Production of Prefabricated Building Components Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Wang

Guo

et al. 2023

Buildings

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Prefabricated buildings are gradually being promoted from pilot demonstration to scale, to combat climate change and improve energy conservation and emission reduction in the building sector. Despite the carbon emission of assembled structures being substantially lower than that of cast-in-place buildings due to the significant reduction in energy demand during the materialization process, there is still a lot of room for improvement. This study looks at the strategy choices made by manufacturers of prefabricated building components in relation to lowering carbon emissions from the standpoint of manufacturing prefabricated building components. By building a dynamic evolutionary game model between two parties, we investigate the evolutionary process of the strategy chosen by prefabricated building component manufacturers and the government, analyzing the evolutionary stability of each side’s strategy choice, and finally using Matlab tools to simulate the effectiveness of the evolutionary stability. The study findings indicate that (1) low-carbon production costs, local government incentives and sanctions, and corporate low-carbon production benefits are the main influencing factors for manufacturers of prefabricated building components to adopt low-carbon production techniques; and that (2) the cost of regulation under low-carbon production methods and the local government performance assessment system are the key elements affecting regulations by the local government. Based on this finding, we suggest corresponding countermeasures in three areas, including investigating new low-carbon technology options for businesses, developing a new carbon emission accounting subsidy mechanism, and improving the regulatory framework of the government, to provide an efficient pathway for the growth of a low-carbon economy.

show abstract

Section: Model Assumptions and Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Paths for the Production of Prefabricated Building Components Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Wang

Guo

et al. 2023

Buildings

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Выявленный нами первый тренд -рассмотрение ценности игрового моделирования через призму взаимодействия, а не столкновения, подтверждает и Д. Лемперт [15], говоря о том, что эволюционная теория игр имеет долгую историю моделирования человеческих взаимодействий и недавно начала использоваться для анализа появления и прогноза долгосрочной жизнеспособности работы команды.…”

Section: игра с двумя популяциями населенияunclassified

Game Modeling of the Political Space: Analysis of Foreign Literature

Bayer

Vasilyeva

Ветренко

2021

Upravlencheskoe konsul'tirovanie

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose is to identify the main trends and gaps in the research of foreign scientists on the topic “Game modeling of political space”.Methods. In this review, the authors used a semi-systematic method of researching the literature, in which at the first stage they used quantitative methods, and then the selected array of publications was investigated by the integrative method, revealing theoretical studies and practical results of the application of game political components.Results. Based on the selected foreign publication stream on the topic “game modeling of political space” by the method of semi-systematic analysis, six main trends in the study and application of game theory and game modeling in political discourse have been identified:considering the value of game modeling through the prism of interaction, not collision of actors;application of game modeling in the development and adoption of political decisions;development of new approaches to the analysis of the very methodology of game modeling in politics;game as a form of effective political communication;study of game theory on the basis of fundamental classical monographs of the mid-20th century as applied to the solution of pressing political problems;application of game modeling in predicting election results, especially in those political systems that are based on the theory of rational choice during voting.A lacuna in the studies of recent decades has identified the issue of using political game modeling in electoral processes. Despite the continuing relevance of the topic of elections around the world, no significant volume of publications was selected.Conclusions. Foreign researchers use the potential of game modeling in politics more often and more multifaceted than in domestic political science. Evolutionary game-theoretic models are used not only to model political and international processes themselves, but also to related social spheres, such as economics, religious and ethnic relations. Game theory is used to study a wide range of social and political problems and social phenomena: voting, fundamentalism, religious and ethnic conflicts, civil violence.

show abstract

“…Understanding the evolution sheds light on the dynamics and sustainability of the BFM. In evolutionary games, the assumption of complete rationality is abandoned in favor of analyzing the dynamic adjustment process, which compensates for the lack of a rational and static perspective [29] and is more in line with real-life human decision-making situations in which game parties can choose to cooperate or not cooperate based on the analysis of realistic factors, their own cognition, and the continuous trial and error process [30].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governmental Intervention in the Sustainable Mechanism of China’s Blue Finance

Chen¹,

Huang²

2023

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article is a case study of the blue finance mechanism (BFM) in China and makes use of evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation to show how the BFM plays a critical role in promoting the sustainable development of China’s marine economy, society, and environment. To ensure the perpetuation of the BFM, it is necessary for the Chinese government to attract private sector investment in the marine sector (PSIMS). By intervening in the BFM, the government can create a more favorable investment environment, which can then lead to greater private sector investment and contribute to the overall sustainability of the ocean. The goal of this article is to create an analytical model based on public finance and government management to examine the efficiency of Chinese governmental involvement in the BFM in order to boost the maritime industry by attracting private sector investment for funding the BFM. The results revealed the following: First, governmental involvement can have significant positive effects in promoting the sustainable development of the BFM in China. Second, the timeliness of governmental intervention in China can affect the private sector’s incentive to invest in the marine sector. Third, the Chinese government’s intervention in subsidizing costs can have significant impacts in engaging the private sectors to expand capital injection into marine investments. The minimization of potential risks of investment in the marine sector is critical to enhancing investor confidence and trust. The early intervention of the Chinese government is therefore crucial. Additionally, to further incentivize PSIMS, the Chinese government must make a concerted effort to increase subsidies and provide non-monetary rewards. This will help achieve sustainable development in the country’s economy, society, and environment.

show abstract

On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning

Cited by 4 publications

References 66 publications

Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Paths for the Production of Prefabricated Building Components Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Paths for the Production of Prefabricated Building Components Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Game Modeling of the Political Space: Analysis of Foreign Literature

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governmental Intervention in the Sustainable Mechanism of China’s Blue Finance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About