On False Data-Injection Attacks against Power System State Estimation: Modeling and Countermeasures

Yang, Qingyu; Yang, Jie; Yu, Wei; An, Dou; Zhang, Nan; Zhao, Wei

doi:10.1109/tpds.2013.92

Cited by 350 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In the smart-world systems (e.g., smart cities, smart grid, smart transportation), a number of efforts have been devoted to studying the impacts of cyber attacks as well as the development of defensive schemes [5,6,7,11,13,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,27,28,29,30,31,32]. For example, Ericsson et al [33] presented some important issues on the cyber security and information security in the energy-based cyber-physical systems.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Particularly, there have been a number of research efforts devoted to data integrity attacks against key functional modules in the energy-based cyber-physical systems, as well as defense thereof [7,14,15,32,35,36]. For example, Yang et al [13] developed an optimal attack strategy against the state estimation process that enables a minimum set of compromised sensors to launch a successful attack. Yang et al [35] developed mechanisms for optimal PMU (Phasor Measurement Unit) placement to defend against data integrity attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a typical smart-world system, the smart cities that integrate energy, transportation and other smart-world components, potential adversaries may launch malicious attacks via controlling smart meter and sensor devices, and may manipulate critical information, including energy consumption/supply, the state of power transmission and distribution links, electricity prices, transportation routes, and so on [3,12,13,14,15,16]. As smart meters in the power grid subsystem, which is an essential component in the smart cities, are often deployed in the open environment, the power grid may suffer greater risks than the traditional power grid.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As smart meters in the power grid subsystem, which is an essential component in the smart cities, are often deployed in the open environment, the power grid may suffer greater risks than the traditional power grid. Unlike the cyber-attacks on communication networks alone, the potential attacks in the power grid can lead to serious economic and physical damages [7,13,14,15,17]. …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There have been a number of research efforts devoted to studying the impacts of cyber-attacks in smart-world systems [4,5,6,7,11,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25]. Nonetheless, most of the existing efforts focus on strategies of attack or defense in a singular or specifically unique security issue, often in which only one adversary launches an attack at a time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Yang

et al. 2018

Sensors

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Diverse and varied cyber-attacks challenge the operation of the smart-world system that is supported by Internet-of-Things (IoT) (smart cities, smart grid, smart transportation, etc.) and must be carefully and thoughtfully addressed before widespread adoption of the smart-world system can be fully realized. Although a number of research efforts have been devoted to defending against these threats, a majority of existing schemes focus on the development of a specific defensive strategy to deal with specific, often singular threats. In this paper, we address the issue of coalitional attacks, which can be launched by multiple adversaries cooperatively against the smart-world system such as smart cities. Particularly, we propose a game-theory based model to capture the interaction among multiple adversaries, and quantify the capacity of the defender based on the extended Iterated Public Goods Game (IPGG) model. In the formalized game model, in each round of the attack, a participant can either cooperate by participating in the coalitional attack, or defect by standing aside. In our work, we consider the generic defensive strategy that has a probability to detect the coalitional attack. When the coalitional attack is detected, all participating adversaries are penalized. The expected payoff of each participant is derived through the equalizer strategy that provides participants with competitive benefits. The multiple adversaries with the collusive strategy are also considered. Via a combination of theoretical analysis and experimentation, our results show that no matter which strategies the adversaries choose (random strategy, win-stay-lose-shift strategy, or even the adaptive equalizer strategy), our formalized game model is capable of enabling the defender to greatly reduce the maximum value of the expected average payoff to the adversaries via provisioning sufficient defensive resources, which is reflected by setting a proper penalty factor against the adversaries. In addition, we extend our game model and analyze the extortion strategy, which can enable one participant to obtain more payoff by extorting his/her opponents. The evaluation results show that the defender can combat this strategy by encouraging competition among the adversaries, and significantly suppress the total payoff of the adversaries via setting the proper penalty factor.

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