On Frege's Alleged Indispensability Argument†

Garavaso, Pieranna

doi:10.1093/philmat/nki018

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…95-112;Colyvan, 2001, pp. 8-9;Sereni, 2014), though this connection has been disputed (Garavaso, 2005). The connection to be argued in this paper will differ from this.…”

Section: A Quinean Reformulation Of Fregean Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 72%

A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments

Gan

2022

Acta Anal

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“…95-112;Colyvan, 2001, pp. 8-9;Sereni, 2014), though this connection has been disputed (Garavaso, 2005). The connection to be argued in this paper will differ from this.…”

Section: A Quinean Reformulation Of Fregean Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 72%

A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments

Gan

2022

Acta Anal

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“…Although distant ancestors of indispensability arguments may be found in Frege (1893-1903; see also Garavaso 2005 andSereni 2015) and in Gödel ( , 1964, the first substantial suggestions are to be found in Quine (1948Quine ( , 1951Quine ( , 1966Quine ( , 1969Quine ( , 1981, while a first explicit formulation is to be found in Putnam (1971). The contemporary debate on the indispensability argument has two major loci.…”

Section: The Indispensability Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indispensability and explanation: an overview and introduction

2016

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“…56 Some of Frege's remarks [1893Frege's remarks [ -1903 have sometimes be taken as a statement of a form of IA in nuce (but see Garavaso [2005] and Sereni [2013]). But it would be utterly implausible to claim that anything like IA was Frege's main argument for believing in the existence of mathematical objects.…”

Section: Assertoric-use Qp (Ii)mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Indispensable Premises of the Indispensability Argument

Panza

Sereni

2014

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

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International audienceWe identify four different minimal versions of the indispensability argument, falling under four difference varieties: an epistemic argument for semantic realism, an epistemic argument for platonism, and a non-epistemic version of both. We argue that most current formulations of the argument can be reconstructed by building upon the suggested minimal versions. Part of our discussion relies on a clarification of the notion of (in)dispensability as relational in character. We then present some substantive consequences of our inquiry for the philosophical significance of the indispensability argument, the most relevant of which being that both naturalism and confirmational holism can be dispensed with, contrary to what is held by many

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On Frege's Alleged Indispensability Argument†

Cited by 9 publications

References 11 publications

A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments

A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments

Indispensability and explanation: an overview and introduction

On the Indispensable Premises of the Indispensability Argument

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