On How (Not) to Argue for Preferring God’s Non-Existence

Abstract

Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it’s rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it’s difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall.

Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils

“…Similar versions of this argument can be found in Jackson (2021) and Jackson (ms.). 18 There are related pragmatic arguments from the Axiology of Theism (e.g., Penner and Arbour (2017), Lougheed (2019), Lougheed (2020), Lougheed (2022), Licon (2021)). Some of these arguments may be related to (and may be reformulated as) pragmatic arguments from horrendous evils.…”

“…18 18 There are related pragmatic arguments from the Axiology of Theism (e.g., Penner and Arbour (2017), Lougheed (2019), Lougheed (2020), Lougheed (2022), Licon (2021)).Some of these arguments may be related to (and may be reformulated as) pragmatic arguments from horrendous evils. A related strategy some philosophers of religion take is to demonstrate that the narrative/worldview of theism is preferable or is more effective in reaching some pragmatic end than non‐theism, with pragmatic ends broad enough to include: which narrative is preferable, or helps us cope better, or helps us make sense of horrendous evils better etc.…”