On limiting the market for status signals

Ireland, Norman J.

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90015-9

Cited by 212 publications

(140 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…3 While Veblens work was rich in illustrating manifold facets of status-seeking behavior, the present paper takes a more narrow approach to positional concerns by investigating spending on highly visible goods suited to signal one's usually unobserved wealth. The basic idea has been elaborated in different signaling status models (Ireland 1994, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1995, Glazer and Konrad 1996, Corneo and Jeanne 1998, to mention a few). In accordance with such models, Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) derive a simple signaling framework for empirically investigating visible consumption.…”

Section: Related Literature and Model Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

Kaus¹

2013

Journal of Development Economics

102

101

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A century ago, Thorstein Veblen introduced socially contingent consumption into the economic literature. This paper complements the scarce empirical literature by testing his conjecture on South African household data and finds that Black and Coloured households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable White households. In an emerging economy context, this is especially important as it carries implications for spending on future assets. This paper explores whether the differences in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status seeking. Among Black households, spending on visible consumption is found to change predictably with different reference group incomes.

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Section: Related Literature and Model Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

Kaus¹

2013

Journal of Development Economics

102

101

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“…Men face a trade-o¤ between investing in their survival, and conspicuous consumption that signals their quality and thus increases their matching probability. Much of the theory emphasizes the role of status goods as signals of income (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996;Corneo and Jeanne 1997;Frank 1985Frank , 1986Ireland 1994Ireland , 1998Ireland , 2001; Glazer and Konrad 1996; Moav and Neeman 2012) often with consideration of the role of the income of potential grooms in the context of marriage matching. 3 Men may incur debt to provide a dishonest signal of their desirability as a mate (Gallup and Frederick 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 8307 July 2014 ABSTRACTOld Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy *

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“…This is a usual result in the literature (e.g. Ireland, 1994Ireland, , 1998Ireland, , 2001, except that in our model it arises with endogenous relative concerns. Looking at how changes with is not very informative about the after-tax distribution of incomes, since e¤orts (and then output) respond to .…”

Section: 4mentioning

confidence: 79%

Conspicuous Consumption in the Land of Prince Charming

Truglia¹

2010

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. Conspicuous consumption is a signaling device used to allocate non-market goods (i.e. goods that cannot be traded in markets). In sharp contrast to the existing literature, in our model people do not want to signal wealth but some unobservable traits that, conditional on other observable information, are correlated with wealth. For instance, in order to get non-markets goods like respect, esteem and admiration, people want to signal the talents that generated the wealth, and not the wealth itself. Both the nature of the equilibrium and the policy implications depart dramatically from the literature. More and more papers argue that, because of relative concerns, the government should redistribute heavily. Our model shows that, once taken in a general-equilibrium context, those arguments break down. Furthermore, our model o¤ers explanations beyond the current reach of the literature, like a theory of the natural rate of inequality.

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On limiting the market for status signals

Cited by 212 publications

References 6 publications

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy

Conspicuous Consumption in the Land of Prince Charming

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