On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication

Intemann, Kristen; de Melo-Martín, Inmaculada

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04322-z

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 74 publications

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“…Non-experts (regardless of their values) have an interest in understanding the state of the science or science-based recommendations in ways that will allow them to exercise their autonomy and make decisions about how to act or what policies to support or adopt. 4 Thus, facilitating trust will require experts to be transparent about the values that may be relevant to non-experts' ability to assess the science and science-based recommendations (Intemann & de Melo-Martín, 2023). In communicating about the toxicity of substances, for example, it may be particularly important to explain that there is a chance of error and explain the values assumed in decisions about the kinds of error assumed to be most acceptable (e.g., whether risks to human health or risks to overregulation are being given more weight).…”

Section: Implications For Value Transparency In Science Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication

Intemann

2024

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If contextual values can play necessary and beneficial roles in scientific research, to what extent should science communicators be transparent about such values? This question is particularly pressing in contexts where there appears to be significant resistance among some non-experts to accept certain scientific claims or adopt science-based policies or recommendations. This paper examines whether value transparency can help promote non-experts’ warranted epistemic trust of experts. I argue that there is a prima facie case in favor of transparency because it can promote four conditions that are thought to be required for epistemic trustworthiness. I then consider three main arguments that transparency about values is likely to be ineffective in promoting such trust (and may undermine it). This analysis shows that while these arguments show that value transparency is not sufficient for promoting epistemic trust, they fail to show that rejecting value transparency as a norm for science communicators is more likely to promote warranted epistemic trust than a qualified norm of value transparency (along with other strategies). Finally, I endorse a tempered understanding of value transparency and consider what this might require in practice.

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Section: Implications For Value Transparency In Science Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication

Intemann

2024

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Self Cite

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Arguing About Controversial Science in the News: Does Epistemic Uncertainty Contribute to Information Disorder?

Zheng,

Ledford,

Schneider

2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The Ethical Obligation for Research During Public Health Emergencies: Insights From the COVID-19 Pandemic

Barosa,

Jamrozik,

Prasad

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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In times of crises, public health leaders may claim that trials of public health interventions are unethical. One reason for this claim can be that equipoise—i.e. a situation of uncertainty and/or disagreement among experts about the evidence regarding an intervention—has been disturbed by a change of collective expert views. Some might claim that equipoise is disturbed if the majority of experts believe that emergency public health interventions are likely to be more beneficial than harmful. However, such beliefs are not always justified: where high quality research has not been conducted, there is often considerable residual uncertainty about whether interventions offer net benefits. In this essay we argue that high-quality research, namely by means of well-designed randomized trials, is ethically obligatory before, during, and after implementing policies in public health emergencies (PHEs). We contend that this standard applies to both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and we elaborate an account of equipoise that captures key features of debates in the recent pandemic. We build our case by analyzing research strategies employed during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding drugs, vaccines, and non-pharmaceutical interventions; and by providing responses to possible objections. Finally, we propose a public health policy reform: whenever a policy implemented during a PHE is not grounded in high-quality evidence that expected benefits outweigh harms, there should be a planned approach to generate high-quality evidence, with review of emerging data at preset time points. These preset timepoints guarantee that policymakers pause to review emerging evidence and consider ceasing ineffective or even harmful policies, thereby improving transparency and accountability, as well as permitting the redirection of resources to more effective or beneficial interventions.

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On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication

Cited by 5 publications

References 74 publications

Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication

Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication

Arguing About Controversial Science in the News: Does Epistemic Uncertainty Contribute to Information Disorder?

The Ethical Obligation for Research During Public Health Emergencies: Insights From the COVID-19 Pandemic

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