On Mellor and the Future Direction of Time

Leininger, Lisa

doi:10.1093/analys/ant088

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similar views have been defended in(Savitt 2002),(Dieks 2006),(Dorato 2006),(Oaklander 2012),(Leininger 2014), and(Mozersky 2015).…”

supporting

confidence: 62%

Making Sense of the Growing Block View

Deng

2017

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I try to make sense of the growing block view using Kit Fine's three-fold classification of A-theoretic views of time. I begin by motivating the endeavor of making sense of the growing block view by examining John Earman's project in 'Reassessing the prospects for a growing block model of the universe' (section 2). Next, I review Fine's reconstruction of McTaggart's argument and its accompanying three-fold classification of A-theoretic views (section 3). I then consider three interpretations of Earman's growing block model: the hybrid growing block (section 4), the purely tensed growing block (section 5), and Michael Tooley's growing block (section 6). I argue for three claims. First, Finean 'standard' versions of these views are less congenial to the growing blocker than 'non-standard' ones. Second, the hybrid view is problematic on either version. And third, 'non-standard' versions are not fully intelligible. I provide further support for the first and third of these claims and explain why I take them to support a minimal account of passage as succession, which undercuts some of the motivation for Earman's project (section 7). Lastly, I answer three objections (section 8).'[W]hen an event becomes, it comes into existence; and it was not anything at all until it had become … The relation between existence and becoming is very intimate. Whatever is has become, and the sum total of the existent is continually augmented by becoming.' (Broad 1923, 68/9) Roughly then, the view is that both past and present exist, but the future doesn't, and that time's passing consists in the coming into existence of new events. However, going beyond this rough description is surprisingly difficult. In fact, I'll suggest that there is no fully intelligible, more illuminating re-statement of the

show abstract

“…Similar views have been defended in(Savitt 2002),(Dieks 2006),(Dorato 2006),(Oaklander 2012),(Leininger 2014), and(Mozersky 2015).…”

supporting

confidence: 62%

Making Sense of the Growing Block View

Deng

2017

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(Incidentally, it's not clear to me that B-theorists should claim any of this (for contrary views, see e.g. Savitt 2002, Oaklander 2012, Leininger 2013, Deng 2013, Mozersky 2015, Frischhut 2013, Hoerl 2014. But many B-theorists do, and that version of the B-theory is widely endorsed.…”

Section: An Interpretation Of Le Poidevin's B-theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

Deng

2015

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In 'Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?', Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin's understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn't be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn't isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin's idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are 'eternally real'. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin's remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.

show abstract

“…Typically, the denial that there is a changing present is understood as a denial that time passes; however, some have defended more minimal conceptions of temporal passage which do not appeal to a changing present (e.g. Deng 2013; Leininger 2013;Mozersky 2015.). On this type of view, passage is real, but it is not robust.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act

Young

2022

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Here, I put forward a new account of how experience gives rise to the belief that time passes. While there is considerable disagreement amongst metaphysicians as to whether time really does pass, it has struck many as a default, ‘common sense’ way of thinking about the world. A popular way of explaining how such a belief arises is to say that it seems perceptually as though time passes. Here I outline some difficulties for this approach, and propose instead that the belief in time passing is elicited by a particular feature of agentive experience. When we deliberately move our bodies, bring something to mind, or focus our attention, we experience ourselves as the sources of these actions. Sensing oneself as a source, I argue, is a unique type of change experience, one which leads us to a belief that time is passing.

show abstract

On Mellor and the Future Direction of Time

Cited by 9 publications

References 4 publications

Making Sense of the Growing Block View

Making Sense of the Growing Block View

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About