On neuropsychoanalytic metaphysics

Abstract

Neuropsychoanalysis focuses on the neural counterparts of psychoanalytically interesting phenomena and has left the difference in the metaphysical presuppositions between neuroscience and psychoanalysis unexamined. The authors analyse the logical possibilities concerning the relation between the brain and the mental unconscious in terms of the serial, parallel, epiphenomenalist and Kantian conceptions, and conclude that none of them provides a satisfactory ground for neuropsychoanalysis. As far as psychoanalytic explanations refer to the mental unconscious, they cannot be verified with the help of neuroscience. Neither is it possible to form a picture of how a neuro-viewpoint might be of help for psychoanalytic theorizing. Neuropsychoanalysis has occasionally been seen as a reductionist affair, but the authors suggest that neuropsychoanalysts themselves lean on the hybrid conception, which combines neuroscientific and psychoanalytic viewpoints. The authors state arguments in favour of the interfield conception of neuropsychoanalysis that takes seriously the metaphysical tensions between neuroscience and psychoanalysis.

La profecía de Freud: del psicoanálisis a la biología de la mente en el estudio del origen y tratamiento de la enfermedad mental

“…Solms (2000) presenta los resultados de su investigación sobre "el soñar" en 361 pacientes con lesiones neurológicas, concluyendo que es posible identificar la participación de funciones mentales complejas y estructuras cerebrales en la generación de un "sistema funcional" como un todo. Talvitie & Ihanus (2011) conciben al "neuropsicoanálisis" como la disciplina intermedia (basada en el concepto de interfield theory) en donde "no es necesario obtener el correlato neuronal de los fenómenos psicoanalíticos sino conocer las diferencias metafísicas entre el psicoanálisis y la neurociencia" (p. 1590) que permitan la complementariedad. El nivel actual de sofisticación de la tecnología ha permitido que la neurociencia empiece a dar respuesta a las interrogantes que presenta el psiquismo humano sin "destapar la cabeza", en palabras de Gabriel García Márquez (Llinás, 2003), como lo hacía Freud.…”

Accounting for Material Reality in the Analytic Subject

“…In the much discussed series of papers, Blass and Carmeli make the case against both neuro-science and neuropsychoanalysis by calling into question the claim that neuroscientific findings are relevant for the justification of psychoanalytic theory and practice [13,14]. They argue for the efficacy of the analytic stance which in their minds focuses on “the understanding of meanings and the role of interpersonal discourse in discerning and justifying these meanings”, versus what they call “biologism” which asserts “only what is biological is real” ([15], p. 1584). A case could here be made that adhering to psychoanalytic principles alone as the complete means for understanding the mind and its self-disruptions (to include brain disorders) can be a reverse variation of biologism, a kind of psychoanalytic-ogism or psychoanalytic reductionism.…”

“…Assimilation of material from one discipline to another can take on various and discrete distinctions that Talvitie and Ihanus [15] organize into three neuropsychoanalytic conceptions that I will amend for our purposes here.…”

“…However some authors, who identify themselves as “new wave reductionists” ( versus classical) clarify their position as one that while interested in mechanistic explanations, does not view the autonomy of psychology and reduction as contradictory views. They favor “explanatory pluralism…a non-reductivist approach that is neither reductive nor anti-reductive” ([15], p. 1585). A less favorable variation of this stance might see it as psychoanalysis subordinating itself to the leading science, like Anna Freud’s “identification with the aggressor” [16].…”

“…A second or hybrid approach attempts to integrate ( versus reduce) or unify the views of psychoanalysis and neuroscience without negating the basic assumptions of either [15]. While this may be a more diplomatic strategy it can minimize or whitewash the irreducible aspects of either discipline, ultimately diminishing the potency of both the organic and immaterial ( das ding an sich ) views.…”