On optimal cartel deterrence policies

Frezal, Sylvestre

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.011

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 5 publications

(4 reference statements)

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“…An important role in this transition played the increase of the role of economic analysis in antitrust decision-making (Katsoulacos, Ulph, 2009). There are many papers devoted to the problem of finding the optimal way that these two approaches can coexist (Block, 1994;Frezal, 2006; Katsoulacos, Ulph, 2008; Katsoulacos, Ulph, 2012) and the discussion is far from being finished.…”

Section: Key Elements For the Analysis Of International Antitrust Expmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative Analusis of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion in Some Transition Economies: Challenges for Effectiveness

Makarov

2014

SSRN Journal

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This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. The experience of BRIC countries, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the CEE countries () in creating antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislative and enforcement practices. This article analyzes enforcement issues, in particularly: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions ("per se" vs "rule of reason"), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities etc. The main challenges for policy effectiveness in this field were outlined. JEL Classification: K21, L41, L42.

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Section: Key Elements For the Analysis Of International Antitrust Expmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative Analusis of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion in Some Transition Economies: Challenges for Effectiveness

Makarov

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…• In theoretische studies wordt bepaald hoe bepaalde regelingen er uit moeten zien om te zorgen voor een zo'n groot mogelijke afschrikkingeffect (de preventieve consequenties van straffen) (zie bijvoorbeeld Whelan, 2007;Acutt en Elliott, 2001;Frezal, 2006;Souam, 2001;Davies en Majumdar 2002;Sidak, Block en Nold, 1981). • Ook ten aanzien van kartels is een vergelijkbare ratio gevonden.…”

Section: Onderzoek Naar Anticipatie-effectenunclassified

Outcome Van Nma-Optreden: Een Beschrijving Van De Berekeningsmethode

2010

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“…On the other hand, Frezal (2006), in a dynamic setting, focuses on the study of the design of optimal audit policy. He concludes that a deterministic and non-stationary policy, where a given industry is controlled every T periods, may be more e¤ective than a stationary one (where an industry is audited with a …xed probability at each period).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Roldán

2012

Economics Manag Strategy

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This paper studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms in oligopolistic markets. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other´s market. The set of market-sharing agreements defines a collusive network, which is under suspicion by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that, from the firm´s point of view, the probability of being caught is endogenous and depends on the agreements each firm has signed. Stable collusive networks can be decomposed into a set of isolated firms and complete alliances of different sizes. While in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when the antitrust authority is considered, the network is stability depends on the network configuration as a whole. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect as they give Firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once. JEL Classification: D43, K21, L41

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On optimal cartel deterrence policies

Cited by 17 publications

References 5 publications

Comparative Analusis of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion in Some Transition Economies: Challenges for Effectiveness

Comparative Analusis of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion in Some Transition Economies: Challenges for Effectiveness

Outcome Van Nma-Optreden: Een Beschrijving Van De Berekeningsmethode

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

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