On perception as the basis for object concepts: a critical analysis

Abstract

Within cognitive and developmental psychology it is commonly argued that perception is the basis for object concepts. According to this view, sensory experiences would translate into concepts as a result of the recognition, correlation and integration of physical attributes. Once attributes are integrated into general patterns, subjects would become able to parse objects into categories. In this article, we critically review the three epistemological perspectives according to which can be claimed that object concepts depend on perception: state non-conceptualism, content non-conceptualism, and content conceptualism. We show the three perspectives have problems that make perception inadequate as a conceptual basis. We suggest that the inquiry about the origin and development of object concepts can benefit from a pragmatic perspective that considers objects’ cultural functions as a conceptual foundation. We address this possibility from the theoretical framework of the pragmatics of the object, considering the importance of objects’ functional permanence.

The road to conventional tool use: Developmental changes in children's material engagement with artifacts in nursery school

“…As noted in previous studies, once children learn the canonical use of an object, they can generalize it to other objects in the same category (e.g., Booth et al., 2010; Greco et al., 1990; Oakes, 2008; Rodríguez, 2012; Wertsch, 1998), thereby making sense of materiality according to a functional criterion. This highlights the importance of seriously considering the cultural function of artifacts as the basis of conceptual thinking (Nelson, 1973), a task still pending in the field of developmental psychology (Alessandroni & Rodríguez, 2019). Canonical uses of artifacts, due to their normative and recurrent nature, allow children to flexibly tailor their behaviors to changes in local conditions (Adolph, 2019) and align their behavior with socially promoted general forms of action (Kärtner, 2015).…”

“…Ontogenetically speaking, the fact that children become skillful tool users implies that they have developed a remarkable degree of behavioral adaptability (Hall, 1963) and the ability to grasp the cultural norms of object use (Costall, 2012; Rodríguez, 2012; Sinha, 2009; Wynberg et al., 2022). Instrumental behavior also brings about a substantial pragmatic profit (Alessandroni & Rodríguez, 2019), since it allows children to perceive and explore the world in innovative ways, which in turn leads to the creation of new possibilities for action and new forms of communication with others (Adolph, 2019; Lockman, 2005; Malafouris, 2020a). Despite the significance of tool use, important questions about how children learn to use everyday artifacts in ecologically realistic settings remain unanswered (Rachwani et al., 2020; Riede et al., 2021).…”

La Perspectiva de Segunda Persona de la Atribución de Estados Mentales: Una Revisión Sistemática de su Estado Actual de Desarrollo

“…Esta crítica constituye una objeción a la totalidad, porque cuestiona un axioma de la P2P: la percepción de estados mentales es directa, básica y no está mediada por significaciones sociales. Por ende, no se trata de una crítica dirigida a perfeccionar la propuesta de la P2P, sino más bien a considerar enfoques alternativos (Alessandroni & Rodríguez, 2018).…”