On physical layer security in WSN over GK fading channels during intercept events

Physical Layer Intercept Probability in Wireless Sensor Networks over Fisher–Snedecor \({\mathcal{F}}\) Fading Channels

“…An eavesdropper attempts to intercept the signal over the i-th wiretap channel, whose capacity is C ei . The secrecy capacity that characterizes transmission from the i-th specified sensor to the sink is the difference between the channel capacity of that i-th main link and the i-th wiretap link, as in [20,23]…”

“…To overcame this issue, scheduling based on the channel cumulative distribution function (CDF) assumption, which was suggested earlier in [21,22] for multiuser downlink wiretap transmission, can be exploited. Hence, scheduling schemes have been utilized in [23] to improve the security of WSN i.e., to decrease the intercept probability of an attacker over generalized K fading links.…”

“…The authors in [23] did not consider the network security-reliability tradeoff (SRT), which is another important issue from the WSN design perspective [24,25]. A detailed review on the challenges and solutions of improving the security and reliability for industrial WSN is given in [6].…”

“…The scheduling framework requires knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of the main as well as the wiretap channels. This is a commonly exploited assumption in PLS analysis and frequently justified in numerous papers [13,[15][16][17]20,23].…”

“…with B denoting the transmission bandwidth. Following the physical layer security literature [16,17,20,23], the eavesdropper is assumed to have perfect knowledge of legitimate transmissions from and to the sink, including the coding and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm, and secret key, except that the source signal is confidential. This is a common assumption in numerous papers since the eavesdropper could be a legitimate WSN user with restricted access to secrecy data.…”