On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations

Bodlović, Petar

doi:10.22329/il.v40i2.6312

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…To see whether this is indeed true, one would need to develop a clear conception of the burden of proof and explore whether this conception equally applies to practical and cognitive presumptions. I deal with this complicated task in Bodlović (2020b).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

Bodlović

2020

Argumentation

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The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions (guiding decisions vs. acquiring information), and promote different kinds of goals (non-epistemic vs. epistemic). Accordingly, there are "practical" and "cognitive" presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher's contention that both types of presumptions have a closely analogous pragmatic function, i.e., that practical and cognitive presumptions are made to avoid greater harm in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty. By comparing schemes of practical and cognitive reasoning, I show that Rescher's contention requires qualifications. Moreover, not only do practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct pragmatic functions, but they also perform different dialogical functions (enabling progress vs. preventing regress) and, in some circumstances, cannot be defeated by the same kinds of evidence. Hence, I conclude that the two classes of presumptions merit distinct treatment in argumentation theory.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

Bodlović

2020

Argumentation

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“…Later, Bodlović (2020: 257) accepted and expanded on this distinction:[W]e might distinguish cognitive (epistemic) and practical presumptions since they operate in different dialogical contexts (epistemic inquiry vs practical deliberation), perform distinct normative functions (promoting epistemic vs non-epistemic goals) and, thereby, have qualitatively different foundations.…”

Section: False Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cognitive presumptions are just those epistemic presumptions that are part of our cognitive toolkit in figuring out the way things are and acquiring true, justified beliefs about them (Bodlović, 2020: 266, 2021: 289–290). As Bodlović (2020: 258) argues, cognitive presumptions are ‘typically used in the context of [epistemic] inquiry’, in the promotion of epistemic goals (ie, finding out truth) (Rescher, 2006: 71).…”

Section: False Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many Sceptics have refused to see that the PoI is a presumption because they have latched onto a narrow, evidentiary understanding of ‘presumption’ as a factual inference in the form, ‘if p then pres q ’ (similar to the evidentiary presumption that a person is presumed deceased if she has been missing for over seven years) (for example, Weigend, 2013: 193–194). Argumentation theory shows us that presumptions are a heterogenous device (Bodlović, 2019, 2020; Gama, 2017; Godden and Walton, 2007; Lewiński 2017), and that the PoI can be seen as a non-evidentiary type of presumption (but a presumption nonetheless)—what Nicholas Rescher (2006: 29) and Petar Bodlović (2021) term a ‘practical presumption’. 2 Benefitting from argumentation theory's more nuanced understanding of presumptions, I demonstrate that the PoI can be a (type of) presumption—specifically, a practical presumption with a non-evidentiary goal: of avoiding the greater harm of wrongfully convicting the innocent as opposed to falsely acquitting the guilty (Bodlović, 2019: 582, 2020; Ullmann-Margalit, 1983: 155).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Argumentation theory shows us that presumptions are a heterogenous device (Bodlović, 2019, 2020; Gama, 2017; Godden and Walton, 2007; Lewiński 2017), and that the PoI can be seen as a non-evidentiary type of presumption (but a presumption nonetheless)—what Nicholas Rescher (2006: 29) and Petar Bodlović (2021) term a ‘practical presumption’. 2 Benefitting from argumentation theory's more nuanced understanding of presumptions, I demonstrate that the PoI can be a (type of) presumption—specifically, a practical presumption with a non-evidentiary goal: of avoiding the greater harm of wrongfully convicting the innocent as opposed to falsely acquitting the guilty (Bodlović, 2019: 582, 2020; Ullmann-Margalit, 1983: 155). If I am right, we can ourselves be sceptical about the Sceptics’ reasons as to why the PoI cannot be a true presumption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Putting the ‘presumption’ back in the ‘presumption of innocence’

2022

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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This article tackles the question: can the Presumption of Innocence (PoI) be a presumption? Whereas many criminal law theorists rejection such a notion, I draw inspiration from argumentation theorists and philosophers—in particular, Petar Bodlović and Edna Ullmann-Margalit—and argue in favour of it; indeed, argumentation theory often holds the PoI out as a paradigmatic presumption. My argument proceeds in three sections. I first show that criminal law theorists writing on the PoI have understood presumptions as evidentiary devices in the form of a modus ponens. On that understanding, the PoI cannot be a presumption. Attention is then drawn to the field of argumentation theory, which teaches us that there are other types of presumptions that are non-evidentiary, not in the form of a modus ponens, require a tentative commitment to q, and require an agent to proceed (act) as if q; viz practical presumptions. The PoI can be understood as such. Finally, it is argued that the PoI, insofar as it requires a tentative commitment to q (here, ‘the defendant is innocent’), can be thought of as a propositional imagining of q (ie, an agent presuming innocence is to propositionally imagine the defendant's innocence).

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Environmental interference

Kovaka

2024

Biol Philos

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One of the guiding ideas in modern environmentalist thought is that we shouldn’t interfere with nature. It’s better to leave it alone. Many of the arguments offered in favor of this presumption against environmental interference are epistemic. One such argument focuses on ineffectiveness. It says that conservation interventions often do not accomplish their goals. A second argument says that well-intentioned interference in nature produces many harmful unintended consequences. I show that these arguments do not justify the presumption against environmental interference. Both arguments depend on stronger claims, such as the claim that conservation interventions do more harm than good overall. Yet, evidence-based conservation studies do not support the idea that conservation interventions generally do not work, or that they do more harm than good. These facts seriously undermine the presumption against environmental interference.

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On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations

Cited by 6 publications

References 36 publications

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

Putting the ‘presumption’ back in the ‘presumption of innocence’

Environmental interference

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