We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts (1) elections are more likely to be close, and (2) voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through pre-election polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process. We analyze both small and large elections. We show that if the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, then the unique type-symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which the probability that either alternative wins the election is 1 2 . We demonstrate that this neutrality result is endemic to large elections. By contrast, when citizens are ignorant about the distribution of preferences, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the distribution of preferences.JEL Classifications: C72, D72, D82.