On relativist approaches to many-one identity

Abstract

Composition as identity is the view that a whole is identical to its parts taken collectively. Such a view raises the question of how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things. A primitivist view holds that there is no explanation to be had and that we simply need to accept that being one thing and being many things are compatible. One might think that we can do better by resorting to relativization. A relativist view may seem to explain how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things on the basis of the assumption that the portion of reality is these ways relative to different 'concepts' or 'counts'. This paper discusses whether relativization truly leads to a satisfactory explanation of how something can be both one thing and many things. The conclusion will be that, when we consider the current accounts of the involved parameters, these relativizations make no explanatory progress.

Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology

“…They are it', as Lewis (1991: 83) 7 For some 'count-based' versions of CAI see, among others, Bøhn (2014Bøhn ( , 2019, Wallace (2011a, 2011b), and Cotnoir (2013. For some interesting criticism see Lipman (2018).…”