2013 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security 2013
DOI: 10.1109/ares.2013.77
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On Selecting Critical Security Controls

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Cited by 15 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…To address this bias, we test the ATE estimator models with refutation methods to verify the estimated effect and validity of our assumptions. We run three refuting tests using doWhy 4 package to test the robustness of estimates for ATE-(a) replacing treatment variable with noise; (b) Adding an unobserved confounder to the model to test unconfoundedness assumptions; and (c) removing a random subset of data to check the estimator has generalisation property. We observe no change in ATE estimate with the above tests confirming the robustness of estimator.…”
Section: Threats To Validitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To address this bias, we test the ATE estimator models with refutation methods to verify the estimated effect and validity of our assumptions. We run three refuting tests using doWhy 4 package to test the robustness of estimates for ATE-(a) replacing treatment variable with noise; (b) Adding an unobserved confounder to the model to test unconfoundedness assumptions; and (c) removing a random subset of data to check the estimator has generalisation property. We observe no change in ATE estimate with the above tests confirming the robustness of estimator.…”
Section: Threats To Validitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Business impact/disruption, anticipated loss, profit reduction, fines, reputation, decline in stock price, damage [17]- [23]  Risk tolerance [12], [19], [24]; Budget [19]  Legal and regulatory [22]  Self-imposed constraints [22] Asset  Importance/value [13], [24]- [27]  Assessed risk [12], [24]  Probability of breach, event, or successful attack [13], [24], [26], [28], [29] Threat  Anticipated [25], [27], [30], [31]  Most significant [25]  Residual risk [23], [32]; Incident data [17] Control  Cost, general [12], [13], [30], [32], [18], [20]- [23], [26]- [28]  Purchase/setup [17], [24], [25], [33]- [35]  Number of controls as a proxy for cost [36]  Difficulty of implementation [25]  Operation, training, and maintenance cost [17], [24], [25],…”
Section: Organizationalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is used to analyze problems where there are some measures of costs and benefits that can be traded off to arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. Researchers investigate a number of MCDM techniques for this problem, some of which include or are based on fuzzy set theory [34], multi-attribute utility theory (i.e., value functions, knapsack strategy) [18], [27], [30], [37], evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms [13], [20], [23], [26], [32], [35], analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [31], grey relational analysis (GRA) [25], simple additive weighting (SAW) [17], the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOP-SIS) [25], and preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluation (PROMETHEE) [33].…”
Section: Organizationalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Una solución cuantitativa para la selección de ISC se considera un problema NP-Hard (Tosatto, Governatori, & Kelsen, 2015). Existen propuestas que apuntan al uso de métodos matemáticos para apoyar la selección del ISC -ver por ejemplo (Breier & Hudec, 2013b;Cuihua & Jiajun, 2009;J. Lv, Zhou, & Wang, 2011;Yang, Shieh, Leu, & Tzeng, 2009) -.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified