On self-serving strategic beliefs

Abstract

We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another's intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from subsequently causing harm. We hypothesize that players will justify taking by engaging in "strategic cynicism," convincing themselves of the opponent's ill intentions. We elicit incentivized beliefs both from players with such an incentive and from neutral third parties with no incentive to bias their beliefs. We find no difference between the two sets of beliefs, suggesting that people do not negatively bias their beliefs about a strategic opponent even when they have an incentive to do so. This result contrasts with Di Tella, et al. (2015), who argue that they provide evidence of strategic cynicism. We reconcile the discrepancy by using Di Tella, et al.'s, data, a simple model of strategic belief manipulation and a novel experiment in which we replicate Di Tella, et al.'s, experiment and also elicit the beliefs of neutral third parties. Across three experimental datasets, the results provide no evidence of negatively biased beliefs about others' intentions. However, Di Tella, et al.'s, results and our novel data indicate that those with a greater incentive to view others' intentions negatively exhibit relatively less positive beliefs than those without such incentives.

Redistribution and Beliefs about the Source of Income Inequality

“…Indeed, participants are more likely to give when recipients are believed to be poor because of bad luck rather than lack of effort. 8 5 If potentially surprising, this result is nevertheless in line with recent laboratory findings that show limits about where and when people engage in self-serving deception for financial gain (e.g., Van der Weele et al, 2014;Bartling andÖzdemir, 2017 andGing-Jehli et al, 2020). Moreover, this result is consistent with field data showing that Mormons do not bias their definition of what constitutes income for the purpose of tithing in the direction of their own financial self-interest (Dahl and Ransom, 1999).…”

“…Bartling and Özdemir (2017) find that people do not use the replacement excuse "if I don't do it, someone else will" if a social norm of moral behavior exists. Ging-Jehli et al (2020) do not find evidence that player adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. In this paper, I contribute to this literature by providing one important example, in the context of redistribution, in which people with a financial incentive to engage in belief manipulation do not do so.…”

Redistribution and beliefs about the source of income inequality

“…5 If potentially surprising, this result is nevertheless in line with recent laboratory findings that show limits about where and when people engage in self-serving deception for financial gain (e.g., Van der Weele et al, 2014;Bartling andÖzdemir, 2017 andGing-Jehli et al, 2020). Moreover, this result is consistent with field data showing that Mormons do not bias their definition of what constitutes income for the purpose of tithing in the direction of their own financial self-interest (Dahl and Ransom, 1999).…”

Ignorance, Intention and Stochastic Outcomes

“…If the first player believed that the second player would take a large amount away from her, he could justify taking a large sum from the second player. However, eliciting the beliefs of the first player, Ging-Jehli et al (2020) find no evidence for strategic cynicism.…”