On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative ExploitersLone Grønbaek Kronbak Marko Lindroos August 2008All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. AbstractGame-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are biological independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a noncooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.

Recent Developments in Fisheries Economics Research

“…Multispecies models are rarely used due to the complicated analytical matters. One of few examples is found in the non-cooperative literature, where the biological interrelationship is related to the number of players, which can be sustained in a two-species non-cooperative fishery game (Kronbak and Lindroos, 2011). Stepping further into the more advanced biological relationship and the international dimensions demand empirical models, since the demonstrated literature is about on the edge of finding analytical results.…”

Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries

“…A few contributions consider that agents might exploit several stocks simultaneously, and that these stocks might be biologically dependent. One might quote Fischer and Mirman ( [11], [12]), Hannesson [14], who analyse a two-country, two-species model and characterize the optimal non-cooperative consumption policies, or Kronbak and Lindroos [18] who characterize the number of exploiters that may be sustained in a non-cooperative equilibrium without driving one stock to extinction. A recent literature has provided game-theoretic treatments of marine protected areas (Sanchirico and Wilen [23], Busch [6]) and highlighted their potential as environmental conservation tools.…”