On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World

Thomas, William R.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2729580

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…This pragmatic deterrence function could constitute a potential explanation of the luck-infused construction of the renunciation defense (Brink, 2013 ; Duff, 2003 ; Yaffe, 2010 ). However, this argument does not work in tort law, in which the deterrence function is much less prominent (Thomas, 2012 ). Nevertheless, as argued in Sect.…”

Section: Luck Morality and The Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Robert Thomas writes that ‘the law has long recognized a presumption against criminal strict liability—the Supreme Court describes it as a "generally disfavored status"'’ (Thomas, 2012 , p. 649). 1 The Supreme Court of the United States stated that: The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction

Skoczeń

2023

Synthese

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Legal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome, which is called the renunciation defense, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt versus perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N = 479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt versus perpetration distinction.

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Section: Luck Morality and The Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction

Skoczeń

2023

Synthese

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“…However, the fact that a commission or an omission offense has been committed needs to be proven. Within the criminal law, it is used for crimes that do not require the perpetrator's fault or a mental element following its occurrence [9]. L.B.…”

Section: The Nature Of Strict Liabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Strict Liability for Environmental Offenses

Halim¹,

Ali²

2020

Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental and Technology of Law, Business and Education on Post Covid 19, IC

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This study aims to analyze the rationality and application of strict liability for environmental offenses in the Environmental Protection and Management Act of Indonesia. The strict liability set out in this law expressly applies only to civil cases and covers the possibility that it may be used in criminal matters. Normative legal research complemented by a statutory and conceptual approach was used. The results showed that it generally applies to regulatory offenses aimed at protecting the public interest. This doctrine is necessary to improve the long-term and prevents harm to people or the environment. The absence of mental element proof should be limited to offenses that are characterized by the administrative dependence of criminal law, which is reflected in the abstract and concrete endangerment models. The offense is formulated as formal offense by eliminating the element of the perpetrator's culpability, and it is therefore not necessary to prove it.

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“…The essence of these claims is as follows. Causal responsibility is not some junior, broader inquiry that identifies a pool of candidates among whom a more senior concept of moral responsibility allows 22 For some relatively recent discussions of this issue, however, see Thomas (2012), Hamdani (2007). 23 For further discussion of how we are willing to treat more remote causes as responsible causes when the seriousness of the conduct is particularly high, albeit in a slightly different context, see Reiff (2005, 135-6).…”

Section: Moral Responsibility and Causal Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishment in the executive suite: Moral responsibility, causal responsibility, and financial crime

Reiff¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Despite the enormity of the financial losses flowing from the 2008 financial crisis and the outrageousness of the conduct that led up to it, almost no individual involved has been prosecuted for criminal conduct, much less actually gone to prison. This chapter argues that the failure to punish those in management for their role in this misconduct stems from a misunderstanding of the need to prove that they personally knew of this wrongdoing and harbored an intent to defraud. Not only would negligence be a sufficient legal and moral basis for imposing terms of imprisonment in these cases, mere causal responsibility would also be enough, for causal responsibility has embedded in it all we need to find those causally responsible morally responsible too, and once some basis for moral responsibility is established, the imposition of terms of imprisonment is both legally possible and morally just.

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On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction

Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction

Strict Liability for Environmental Offenses

Punishment in the executive suite: Moral responsibility, causal responsibility, and financial crime

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