On Structural Signatures for Tree Data Structures

Samelin, Kai; Pöhls, Henrich C.; Bilzhause, Arne; Posegga, Joachim; Meer, Hermann de

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31284-7_11

Cited by 24 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…But first things first: Obviously an unforgeable SSS can emulate a standard signature by disallowing any modifications by any sanitizer [42]. Second, we note that a RSS for a message of n blocks, fulfilling privacy [7], can trivially be constructed by deploying O(n 2 ) standard digital signatures [7,37]. Hence, O(n 2 ) SSSs are sufficient to construct one RSS.…”

Section: ) a Visiblementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Samelin et al introduced the concept of redactable structure in [38]. The standard security properties of RSSs have been formalized in [7,17,37]. Ahn et al introduced the notion of context-hiding RSSs [1].…”

Section: ) a Visiblementioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, from a practical point of view, such constructions are rather inefficient. Especially as RSS can be constructed in O(n) for computation and storage [37]. We provide the security definitions required to transform only a single invocation of an SSS into an RSS.…”

Section: ) a Visiblementioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Relation between Redactable and Sanitizable Signature Schemes

Meer

Pöhls

Posegga

et al. 2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Malleable signature schemes (MSS) enable a third party to alter signed data in a controlled way, maintaining a valid signature after an authorized change. Most well studied cryptographic constructions are (1) redactable signatures (RSS), and (2) sanitizable signatures (SSS). RSSs allow the removal of blocks from a signed document, while SSSs allow changing blocks to arbitrary strings. We rigorously prove that RSSs are less expressive than SSSs: no unforgeable RSS can be transformed into an SSS. For the opposite direction we give a black-box transformation of a single SSS, with tightened security, into an RSS.

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Section: ) a Visiblementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: ) a Visiblementioning

confidence: 98%

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On the Relation between Redactable and Sanitizable Signature Schemes

Meer

Pöhls

Posegga

et al. 2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…In redactable signature schemes, blocks cannot be modified: they can only be removed, i.e., redacted. Redactable signatures have also been discussed in many varieties, e.g., for quoting [1], [3], [4], arbitrary redactions [14], [22], [26] and more complex data structures like trees [6], [20], [27]. Proxy signatures allow for delegating the signing rights entirely, while sanitizable signatures allow to alter a specific message.…”

Section: B State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scope of Security Properties of Sanitizable Signatures Revisited

Meer

Pöhls

Posegga

et al. 2013

2013 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

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Sanitizable signature schemes allow for altering signed data in a signer-controlled way by a semi-trusted third party. This is contrary to standard digital signature schemes, which do not permit any modifications by any party without invalidating the signature. Due to transparency, a strong privacy notion, outsiders cannot see if the signature for a message was created by the signer or by the semi-trusted party. Accountability allows the signer to prove to outsiders if a message was original or touched by the semi-trusted party. Currently, block-level accountability requires to drop transparency. We allow for accountability for sanitizable signatures with transparency on the block-level. Additionally, we generalize the concept of block-level properties to groups. This offers a even more fine-grained control and leads to more efficient schemes. We prove that group-level definitions imply both the block-level and message-level notions. We derive a provably secure construction, achieving our enhanced notions. A further modification of our construction achieves efficient grouplevel non-interactive public accountability. This construction only requires a constant amount of signature generations to achieve this property. Finally, we have implemented our constructions and the scheme introduced by Brzuska et al. at PKC '09 and provide a detailed performance analysis of our reference implementations.

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“…Constructions that guarantee privacy and integrity in the slightly relaxed three-party model (where the committer is "honest" and the (malicious) prover is different from the committer) considered in this paper have been studied for positive membership queries on dataset [5,6,43], dictionary queries on sets [18,20,32], order queries and statistics on lists [9,11,17,19,25,26,39] and set algebra [18].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Verifiable Range and Closest Point Queries in Zero-Knowledge

Ghosh

Ohrimenko

Tamassia

2016

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Abstract:We present an efficient method for answering one-dimensional range and closest-point queries in a verifiable and privacy-preserving manner. We consider a model where a data owner outsources a dataset of keyvalue pairs to a server, who answers range and closestpoint queries issued by a client and provides proofs of the answers. The client verifies the correctness of the answers while learning nothing about the dataset besides the answers to the current and previous queries. Our work yields for the first time a zero-knowledge privacy assurance to authenticated range and closest-point queries. Previous work leaked the size of the dataset and used an inefficient proof protocol. Our construction is based on hierarchical identity-based encryption. We prove its security and analyze its efficiency both theoretically and with experiments on synthetic and real data (Enron email and Boston taxi datasets).

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On Structural Signatures for Tree Data Structures

Cited by 24 publications

References 17 publications

On the Relation between Redactable and Sanitizable Signature Schemes

On the Relation between Redactable and Sanitizable Signature Schemes

Scope of Security Properties of Sanitizable Signatures Revisited

Efficient Verifiable Range and Closest Point Queries in Zero-Knowledge

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