On textual individuation

Tolhurst, William; Wheeler, Samuel C.

doi:10.1007/bf00377748

Cited by 37 publications

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“…This might occur where one person is seen as more sincere than another, though one has not conceptualized the difference in any particular way, say as providing an advantage in leadership. 7 Tolhurst (1998). 8 See, e.g., Huemer (2005, who calls "an intuition that p a state of its seeming to one that p" (p. 102).…”

Section: Intuition and Non-inferential Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics

Audi

2008

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do not take to be self-evident, and basic moral principles, which they typically do take to be self-evident in a sense explicated in the paper. This explanation is accomplished in part by drawing some analogies between moral and perceptual judgments in the light of a developmental conception of knowledge. The final section of the paper presents a partial account of rational disagreement and indicates how the kind of intuitionist view defended can allow for rational disagreement between apparent epistemic peers.Ethical intuitionism is now widely recognized as a major position in ethical theory. But stereotypes of the view linger, and many people in ethics are unfamiliar with new versions of the position. The challenge for intuitionists is particularly acute because, especially from Moore and Ross onward, intuitionism has been burdened with some rather technical metaphysical and epistemological claims that are not essential to a plausible intuitionism. These claims concern the metaphysics of such notions as the good and the right and the epistemology of such notions as self-evidence and provability. My previous work has dealt with many challenges to intuitionism, but even a book-length treatment must make omissions. My project here is to highlight some major elements in my ethical intuitionism, to extend the position as so far developed, and to respond to some plausible objections to the view which have been recently posed.

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Section: Intuition and Non-inferential Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics

Audi

2008

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…The Morrow Mass was certainly celebrated as an integral part of the daily liturgy by the end of the tenth century, but its intention was not fixed. Special needs took precedence over the king when necessary: Eadem uero matutinalis missa pro rege uel quacumque inminente necessitate celebretur(.RC 86,(13)(14). Equally the selection process was different on Sundays, when the Morrow Mass was celebrated for the Trinity, unless displaced by a feast.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…The rubric for the feast of St Hippolytus(13 August) specifies that if that feast fell on a Saturday, the first eight lessons of Matins were to be of the Virgin (de doming) , and the last four of Hippolytus. Octave of St Stephen (283,[14][15] and the Feast of StAgnes secundo on 28 January (286,[20][21]. This division of an office between two observances also occurred from time to time at first Vespers; it is by no means uncommon to find that the proper texts provided for first Vespers begin only at the chapter, omitting the psalm antiphon which was either taken from the common according to the day of the week, or else from second Vespers of a feast which fell on the previous day.…”

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“…11 Traces of this practice may often be seen in commemorative offices which incorporate texts only for the second half of first Vespers, and will be discussed in more detail below. The Chester source implies that second Vespers of the commemorative office was optional: si debeat habere secundasVesperas (274,[13][14]; presumably its omission or inclusion was dependent on the status of the Sunday or feast occupying the following day.The previous examples demonstrate the precedence of the Saturday commemoration over contingent feasts, but more often the reverse actually applied in most houses, and the commemorative office was moved to some other free day in the week, while the feast was celebrated in the normal manner on the Saturday. Sometimes a memorial of the Virgin was made on this day, and if the feast of St Nicholas…”

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confidence: 99%

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Medieval English Benedictine Liturgy

Harper¹

2019

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“…For loci classici of utterance meaning in hypothetical intentionalism, see Tolhurst (1979, pp. 3–4, 8, 11–12); Tolhurst and Wheeler (1979, pp. 191–194).…”

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confidence: 99%

Literary Fictions as Utterances and Artworks

Mikkonen

2010

Theoria

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During the last decades, there has been a debate on the question whether literary works are utterances, or have utterance meaning, and whether it is reasonable to approach them as such.Proponents of the utterance model in literary interpretation, whom I will refer to as "utterance theorists", such as Noël Carroll and especially Robert Stecker, suggest that because of their nature as linguistic products of intentional human action, literary works are utterances similar to those used in everyday discourse. Conversely, those whom I will refer to as "appreciation theorists", such as Stein Haugom Olsen and Peter Lamarque, argue that literary works are by no means comparable to conversational utterances, and treating them in terms of utterances mistakenly dismisses their literary features. The aim of this article is twofold: to defend a central aspect of the utterance theory and to reconcile the two main positions about central issues in the debate on the meaning of literary works. On the one hand, I shall argue that it is both legitimate and reasonable to discuss the utterance meaning of a literary work on the basis of an interpretative approach interested in the author's "message". My aim is to show that literary works should be considered utterances in a conversational approach which aims at examining the illocutionary actions conveyed through the work. On the other hand, I attempt both to show that there are various legitimate interpretative approaches which are governed by the interpreter's purposes, and to suggest that the debate between utterance theorists and appreciation theorists is actually about merely different emphases.

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On textual individuation

Cited by 37 publications

References 0 publications

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics

Medieval English Benedictine Liturgy

Literary Fictions as Utterances and Artworks

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