On the Alleged Causeless Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Quentin Smith

Abstract

Did the universe come to be without a cause? In "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe" Quentin Smith claimed with considerably more confidence than most cosmologists that all doubts that it did are "unfounded." 1 I demurred, 2 troubled by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason" (PSR): Nothing comes to be without a cause. As Smith himself implicitly acknowledged, even if the Hawking-Penrose theorems predict a cosmic singularity-Hawking is now trying to persuade everyone that they do not if quantum factors are taken into account 3-this only shows that the universe did not have a physical cause. 4 The existence of a cosmic singularity does not automatically exclude a prior supernatural cause. 5 Nor does quantum physics provide a reason for abandoning PSR, once the concept of cause is properly separated from the concept of a determining cause. 6 Thus while the deliverances of contemporary science may warrant the conclusion that the world came to be without a physical cause, they do not warrant Smith's far stronger conclusion that it came to be without any cause whatsoever. Indeed, given PSR, quite the contrary seems warranted: the universe had a cause-a non-physical cause. Given PSR. But why accept PSR? In his reply to me in these pages, "Can Everything Come to Be Without a Cause," Smith maintains that PSR is not self-evident and that my argument for it fails. We thus have no good reason to accept the principle. And therefore he says (paring down his original claim) it is possible the world came to be causelessly. In Part 1,1 will argue that Smith improperly assumes that if PSR is not self-evident or obvious in his narrowly defined sense, then absent a good argument for the principle it is unwise to accept the principle. In Part 2, I will answer his objections to my argument for PSR. In Part 3, I will

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Uncaused Beginning of the Universe

“…The point here is that the contradiction of (1) and (5) in Argument A is meaningless unless Sullivan introduces a principle like (C). Neither (C) nor anything like it, however, is to be found in the original Argument A.…”

“…Not even the PNC is such that anyone who understands it must accept it." 8 But Smith's definition of self-evidence is not about what people must do; it is about what they actually do. Sullivan claims that Smith confuses self-evident with "compelling," and argues that not even patently self-evident propositions such as the PNC have this compelling power.…”

“…12 Sullivan responds to Smith, saying that he has not misconstrued "everything" as meaning "the first state of the universe," but rather that what he is really doing in Argument A is "arguing that if we believe that at least one contingent entity is such that necessarily its coming to be has a cause, then we have no good reason not to believe this is true of all contingent entities that come to be." 13 This line of thinking seems to rest on the proposition:…”

“…On closer inspection, however, we find that it contradicts principle (C). From (5) we know that at least one contingent entity is caused by some other contingent entity. This gives us:…”

“…4 Thomas D. Sullivan has countered Smith's claim that PSR is not self-evident, in addition to providing an alleged deductive proof of PSR. 5 In section 2 of this paper I will argue that PSR is in fact not self-evident, and that Sullivan's argument to the contrary is based on a misunderstanding of what we generally mean by "self-evident." In section 3 I will show that Sullivan's argument for PSR is coherent only after numerous revisions, and that, even after these revisions, it still relies on the further problematic principle that all contingent entities must "come to be" in the same manner.…”