On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting

Bernecker, Sven

doi:10.4324/9781315159591-13

Cited by 21 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Partial forgetting may or may not gradually proceed to complete loss of a memory, or complete forgetting. Although what exactly counts as complete forgetting may pose a difficult question, a sufficient condition for complete forgetting is clear 12 Philosophers and psychologists typically characterize forgetfulness in terms of inaccessibility and information loss (see Bernecker, 2018;Michaelian, 2011;Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). For an inclusive treatment of the concept of forgetting in both senses, see Frise (2018b).…”

Section: Forgetting and The Basis For Retentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence

Sakuragi

2024

PhiMiSci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The problem of forgotten evidence consists of a pair of scenarios originally proposed by Alvin Goldman. In the “forgotten good evidence” and “forgotten bad evidence” scenarios, subjects hold the same memory belief while irreversibly forgetting its original, though different, pieces of evidence. The two scenarios pose a series of challenges to current time slice (CTS) theories, which posit that memory beliefs are justified solely by contemporaneous states. Goldman’s two scenarios pose an apparent dilemma to CTS theories given a naïve picture of how a memory belief is successfully retained while its evidence is irreversibly forgotten. In my view, however, CTS theories may find a solution to the apparent problem by carefully examining the conditions under which a memory belief is successfully retained while its evidence is completely forgotten. Namely, the two scenarios overlook an important difference between forgetting good evidence and forgetting bad evidence.

show abstract

Section: Forgetting and The Basis For Retentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence

Sakuragi

2024

PhiMiSci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…First, one could argue that we have direct control over our attitudes. For such an approach see Bernecker (2018) for a survey of psychological studies demonstrating that we have control over forgetting, that is, there are non-drastic techniques available for forgetting specific things, i.e., directed forgetting. That is, participants instructed to forget some information, e.g., a list of words, are able to do so.…”

Section: Two Versions Of the Control Worrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For more on forgetting see Bernecker (2018) for the degree to which we can be held responsible for both intentional and unintentional forgettings. See also Murray et al (2019) and Irving et al (Forthcoming) for more on the responsibility question, and for whether forgetting is irrational see Broome (2013) or for whether forgetting is simply unfortunate see Williamson (2000).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Importance of Forgetting

Basu

2022

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there's a harder challenge that can't. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world.

show abstract

“…For more discussion of the kind of control we have over forgetting, seeBernecker (2018) Bernecker (2018). also argues that we can responsible for what we forget, though the sense of responsibility in play there is a moral one.4 For other examples of this kind of response to Alston, seeRyan (2003), McHugh (2012), and Peels (2017.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn't typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and find it lacking. We conclude that understanding how agents forget should be as central to social epistemology as understanding how agents form beliefs and share information with others.

show abstract

On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting

Cited by 21 publications

References 21 publications

Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence

Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence

The Importance of Forgetting

Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About