On the Claimed Privacy of EC-RAC III

Fan, Junfeng; Hermans, Jens; Vercauteren, Fréderik

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16822-2_7

Cited by 21 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The authors claimed that by nonlinearity EC-RAC III is able to be resistant to the attacks in [9]. The protocol, unlike the author's claim, is still not secure against the man-in-the-middle attacks on traceability, as shown by Fan, Hermans and Vercauteren in [12]. A…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 90%

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On Elliptic Curve Based Untraceable RFID Authentication Protocols

Ryu

Kim

Yoo³

2015

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security

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An untraceable RFID authentication scheme allows a legitimate reader to authenticate a tag, and at the same time it assures the privacy of the tag against unauthorized tracing. In this paper, we revisit three elliptic-curve based untraceable RFID authentication protocols recently published and show they are not secure against active attacks and do not support the untraceability for tags. We also provide a new construction to solve such problems using the elliptic-curved based Schnorr signature technique. Our construction satisfies all requirements for RFID security and privacy including replay protection, impersonation resistance, untraceability, and forward privacy. It requires only two point scalar multiplications and two hash operations with two messages exchanges. Compared to previous works, our construction has better security and efficiency.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…For EC-RAC III, it does not satisfy both privacy properties, untraceability and forward privacy, as demonstrated in [12]. For EMA, reduced PII and SPA, they do not support even the property of impersonation resistance that is one of the core security requirements any authentication scheme must satisfy.…”

Section: Advantagesmentioning

confidence: 93%

On Elliptic Curve Based Untraceable RFID Authentication Protocols

Ryu

Kim

Yoo³

2015

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security

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“…EC-RAC has been gradually revised in [19,17]. However, Fan et al [10] have shown that the most recent version of EC-RAC [17] is not wide-weak privacy preserving.…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wide–Weak Privacy–Preserving RFID Authentication Protocols

Lee

Batina

Singelée

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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The emergence of pervasive computing devices such as RFID tags raises numerous privacy issues. Cryptographic techniques are commonly used to enable tag-to-server authentication while protecting privacy. Unfortunately, these algorithms and their corresponding implementations are difficult to adapt to the extreme conditions implied by the use of RFID. The extremely limited budget for energy and area do not allow the use of traditional cryptography. In this paper, we address the risk of tracking attacks in RFID networks. Many lightweight protocols have been proposed so far that are founded on both, private-and public-key cryptosystems. We give an overview of existing solutions and discuss the latter ones in more detail. The solutions we advocate in this paper rely exclusively on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We describe several authentication protocols that have different computational demands and accordingly different security features. To the best of our knowledge, these protocols are the first ECCbased authentication protocols which offer privacy protection against a wide-weak attacker. Compared to other RFID schemes proposed in the literature, our protocols remain lightweight in terms of area and computation time, while still achieving the required security and privacy properties.

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“…Finding appropriate trade-offs which meet this requirement while simultaneously catering for any resource constraints is difficult however. In common with other examples, this is 1 For an excellent overview, see [ highlighted by the EC-RAC family [27,28,26] of ECC-based protocols, each of which was broken [6,38,14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Light-weight primitive, feather-weight security

Banciu

Hoerder

Page

2013

Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security

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In [12], the authors present a new light-weight cryptographic primitive which supports an associated RFID-based authentication protocol. The primitive has some structural similarities to AES, but is presented as a keyed one-way function using a 128-bit key. Although a security analysis is included, this is at a high-level only. To provide a more concrete idea as to the security of this primitive, we therefore make three contributions: first, a structural attack requiring Op2 5 q plaintext/ciphertext pairs (and hence effort online) plus Op2 21 q effort offline, second algebraic attacks on round reduced versions of the primitive which requires only a single plaintext/ciphertext pair, and, third debunk the claimed attack of [36] on the same primitive. Our structural attack completely breaks the primitive and the algebraic attack highlights a crucial weakness of the primitive; we conclude that although one can consider countermeasures against these specific attacks, the design in general is questionable and should therefore be avoided.

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On the Claimed Privacy of EC-RAC III

Cited by 21 publications

References 9 publications

On Elliptic Curve Based Untraceable RFID Authentication Protocols

On Elliptic Curve Based Untraceable RFID Authentication Protocols

Wide–Weak Privacy–Preserving RFID Authentication Protocols

Light-weight primitive, feather-weight security

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