On the Composition of Committees

Beniers, Klaas J.; Swank, Otto H.

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewh037

Cited by 24 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In our model, this herding effect does not exist, because hard information prevents experts from lying in order to appear correct. 9 6 Beniers and Swank (2004) analyze the optimal composition of committees in a similar framework. 7 This literature has been initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

Bourjade

2011

The RAND J of Economics

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We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose both the expert's contribution and his identity. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium.The presence of a second expert raises the …rst expert's incentives to report truthfully when reports are public, but reduces them when they are secret. In particular, having an option to call another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public.Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are public, but raises it when they are secret.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

Bourjade

2011

The RAND J of Economics

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“…Their result holds even when committee members' preferences differ much. 6 Li, Rosen, and Suen [2001] show that conflicts of interest limit the possibility of communication (see also Beniers and Swank [2004]). In fact, Li, Rosen, and Suen argue that conflicts of interest provide a rationale for the existence of a voting procedure.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On Committees of Experts

Visser

Swank

2007

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

132

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A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of "the public." Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously. We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also, reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)

Caballero

2011

Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

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On the Composition of Committees

Cited by 24 publications

References 23 publications

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

On Committees of Experts

Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)

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