2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.07.004
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On the decision to go public with dual class stock

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Cited by 31 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Early investigations by Bergström and Rydqvist (1990) based on information from listed Swedish corporations indicated this motivation. Subsequent studies, including Arugaslan et al (2010) using data on US listed companies from 1980 to 2008, reinforced this finding, supporting the notion that control retention is the predominant driving force behind DCS adoption for listing purposes. Public investors' motivations in accepting DCS are not merely passive.…”
Section: The Perspective Of the Decision-makermentioning
confidence: 77%
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“…Early investigations by Bergström and Rydqvist (1990) based on information from listed Swedish corporations indicated this motivation. Subsequent studies, including Arugaslan et al (2010) using data on US listed companies from 1980 to 2008, reinforced this finding, supporting the notion that control retention is the predominant driving force behind DCS adoption for listing purposes. Public investors' motivations in accepting DCS are not merely passive.…”
Section: The Perspective Of the Decision-makermentioning
confidence: 77%
“…The decision-making perspective offers valuable insights into the factors influencing the adoption of DCS.The same applies to the choice of equity system, so existing literatures analyze the causes of DCS from two key perspectives: the motivations of controlling shareholders and the considerations of public investors. Controlling shareholders emphasis on control retention stems from a strong desire to maintain decision-making authority over company operations, rather than seeking to maximize private control gains (Arugaslan et al, 2010;Bergström & Rydqvist, 1990;Dittmann & Ulbricht, 2008;Lauterbach & Yafeh, 2011). Early investigations by Bergström and Rydqvist (1990) based on information from listed Swedish corporations indicated this motivation.…”
Section: The Perspective Of the Decision-makermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A distinguishing attribute of the dual-class structure is the distinct segregation of cash flow rights from voting rights. In contrast to single-class companies, dual-class entities distribute shares with varying voting rights, thereby affording pre-IPO shareholders the opportunity to optimize company value in the event of future acquisitions (Arugaslan et al, 2010). Wang and Yang (2015) ascertained that prior to the disclosure of earnings marked by a notable level of information asymmetry, the high-voting shares within listed companies can enhance price efficiency.…”
Section: Dual-class Structurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This configuration of the dual-class structure assists managers in orienting their attention towards enduring corporate objectives and decisions, while concurrently sidestepping the constraints of shortterm market demands. Arugaslan et al, (2010) depicted that if managers want to retain uncontroversial control and diversify to reduce costs related to poor IPO diversification, the dual-class listing is appropriate. As Li et al, (2018) noted, managers prefer the dual-class structure to keep control over their wealth and spread its risks.…”
Section: Dual-class Structurementioning
confidence: 99%