On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract

Do economic sanctions against target countries work as sender countries intend? If so, what factors make the positive outcomes possible in economic sanctions? Using quantitative methods with the extensive data collection on economic sanctions cases, this study tests a set of hypotheses derived from previous research on the topic and from other theories in the field of international relations. The empirical analyses of this study provide some new findings that were not revealed through previous research on the subject. First, economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom were more likely to succeed. Second, economic sanctions imposed in response to human rights abuses in target countries were less likely to succeed. Finally, the results of this study provide evidence to support the "democratic peace theory": the democratic regime type of the sender nation had a positive impact on the success of economic sanctions.

The Impact of UN and US Economic Sanctions on GDP Growth

“…Most of this research is qualitative, however, and based on single-country case studies. Quantitative assessments of sanction effects typically focus on their impact on various measures of the human rights situation (e.g., Peksen, 2009;Wood, 2008), political stability within the target state (Allen, 2008;Marinov, 2005), level of democracy (Peksen and Drury, 2010), and their success in terms of meeting the desired objectives (e.g., Hufbauer et al, 2009;Drury, 1998;Dashti-Gibson et al, 1997). 1 The findings are dispiriting.…”

Economic Sanctions and Culture

“…6 Allen (2008) observes that the ability of sanctions to successfully mobilize antigovernment activity in a target nation depends on the nature of domestic political institutions in that nation. 7 A similar view is taken by Alerassool (1993), Smith (1995), Dashti-Gibson et al (1997) and Selden (1999). 8 For clear statements of the democratic peace hypothesis and empirical tests that confirm the specific benefits of democracy, see Russett (1993), Dixon (1994), Oneal and Russett (1997), Mousseau (1998), Russett and Oneal (2001), Dixon and Senese (2002) and Danilovic and Clare (2007).…”

“…The conclusions of this literature are quite mixed, the results being heavily dependent on model specification, 4 but a few regularities emerge, namely that the success of sanctions is positively correlated with political instability and economic weakness in the target country (HSE; Lam, 1990;van Bergeijk, 1989van Bergeijk, , 1994 and with close, cordial ties between sanctioner and target prior to the sanctions being imposed (HSE; Lam, 1990;Bonetti, 1998) -hence HSE's well-known dictum that it is better to sanction a friend than an enemy. Many, although not all, 5 empirical studies find a significant positive relationship between the cost of the sanctions to the target, measured as a percentage of the target's GNP, and the success of the sanctions (HSE; Lam, 1990;Dehejia and Wood, 1992;Dashti-Gibson et al, 1997;Drury, 1998;Hart, 2000), while Lam (1990) also finds that the cost of sanctions to the sanctioner is negatively related to sanctions success.…”

Challenges in evaluating impact of sanctions – political vs economic perspective

“…For example Caruso studied panel gravity estimates of bilateral trade between the U.S. and 49 target countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive (e.g., Caruso, 2003. Dashti-Gibson et al (1997) used the same data collected by Hufbauer but employed a logistic regression model to estimate effectiveness of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989 in achieving their respective goals. They questioned the statistical construction of the dependent variable used by Hufbauer et al and, instead, developed a binary dependent variable that assumes a value of one for success and zero for failure episodes.…”