On the Everettian Epistemic Problem

Greaves, H. R. G.

doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.05.004

Cited by 53 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Recall the answer given earlier by Greaves [2007]: a general theory of statistical inference can be defined that applies equally to branching and non-branching theories (without prejudice to either). Very well: such a confirmation theory can be defined; but why should sceptics embrace it?…”

Section: The Evidential Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, the resulting confirmation theory can adjudicate between a chance theory and a weighted-branching theory, and between rival weighted-branching theories (if there are such), and rival chance theories, without prejudice to any (Greaves [2007]). Most important of all, it passes the obvious test: it does not confirm a branching theory come what may, whatever the branch weights 17 .…”

Section: Probability and Decision Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Many Worlds? An Introduction

Saunders¹

2010

Many Worlds?

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This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.

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Section: The Evidential Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Probability and Decision Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Many Worlds? An Introduction

Saunders¹

2010

Many Worlds?

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“…However, the probability that Up is observed by somebody is 1 according to EQM but is less than 1 according to ST. Accordingly, the credential update rule which Greaves [2007a] and Bradley [2011] dub 'naïve conditionalization' appears to break down when one of the options on the table is EQM. The following line of thought is tempting: if the many-worlds theory predicts all possible outcomes, then no possible observation can disconfirm EQM; and since no one-world theory likewise predicts all possible outcomes 4 , every observation confirms EQM over ST.…”

Section: Confirmation In Eqmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bradley argues that, by taking the centred nature of our evidence and the corresponding observation selection effects into account in the right way, Everettians can tell a plausible story about how EQM gets confirmed. The spectre of automatic confirmation of many-worlds theories by any evidence whatsoever, which has worried authors like Barrett, Myrvold and Greaves, is then dispelled without fuss; the 'evidential problem' for EQM is shown not to need a solution of the sort proposed by Greaves [2007a] and by Greaves and Myrvold [2010], which involves a framework of 'quasi-credences' and an associated update rule called 'quasi-conditionalization'. Even if quasi-credence and quasi-conditionalization might be required for us to make sense of the premeasurement credential state of a subject who countenances EQM 1 , such notions are unnecessary for modelling the experimental support that past measurement results provide for the theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty

Wilson¹

2014

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechnics, and to defend the 'halfer' answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley's arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby compelled to adopt the unpopular 'halfer' answer in Sleeping Beauty. These considerations suggest that objective chance is playing an important and under-appreciated role in Sleeping Beauty.

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“…But in fact, David Deutsch (1999), Hilary Greaves and Wayne Myrvold (Greaves 2007a, Greaves andMyrvold 2010) and myself have claimed that it is possible to derive some or all of these links from quantum mechanics and from non-question-begging assumptions of decision theory, essentially by exploiting the symmetries of the quantum state (symmetries that are inevitably broken in non-Everettian physics by the fact that one outcome rather than another actually happens). If so, it would effectively amount to a derivation of Lewis's Principle Principle, and thus of Papineau's two links.…”

Section: Probability In Quantum Theory and Its Alternativesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probability in Physics: Stochastic, Statistical, Quantum

Wilson¹

2014

Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

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I review the role of probability in contemporary physics and the origin of probabilistic time asymmetry, beginning with the pre-quantum case (both stochastic mechanics and classical statistical mechanics) but concentrating on quantum theory. I argue that quantum mechanics radically changes the pre-quantum situation and that the philosophical nature of objective probability in physics, and of probabilistic asymmetry in time, is dependent on the correct resolution of the quantum measurement problem.

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On the Everettian Epistemic Problem

Cited by 53 publications

References 13 publications

Many Worlds? An Introduction

Many Worlds? An Introduction

Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty

Probability in Physics: Stochastic, Statistical, Quantum

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