On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games

Szidarovszky, Ferenc; Okuguchi, Koji

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_16

Cited by 49 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…First, notice that the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium have been shown in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and Hartley (2005). The proof is straightforward.…”

Section: (I) Nash Equilibrium In Contests Without the Possibilities Omentioning

confidence: 87%

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Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation*

Jia

2012

Economic Record

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This article proposes a stochastic foundation for the contest success function (CSF for short) with a richer structure on the set of possible outcomes of the contest. Specifically, the analysis allows for the possibility of a draw, so that no contestant can claim a victory over all other players. Under plausible conditions, this article not only discovers new functional forms of CSFs, but also shows the newly derived CSFs have very different properties in equilibrium to those of conventional CSFs. For example, in contrast to the CSFs discussed in the contest literature, which always generate a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the newly discovered CSFs admit the possibility of multiple equilibria.

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“…First, notice that the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium have been shown in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and Hartley (2005). The proof is straightforward.…”

Section: (I) Nash Equilibrium In Contests Without the Possibilities Omentioning

confidence: 87%

“…The equilibrium behaviour of CSFs of form (14) is thoroughly studied in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and Hartley (2005). In particular, one has the following result:…”

Section: (I) Nash Equilibrium In Contests Without the Possibilities Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation*

Jia

2012

Economic Record

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“…For example, logit-form contest success functions are used in Tullock (1980), Rosen (1986), Dixit (1987), Nitzan (1991), Baik and Shogren (1992), Baik (1994), Skaperdas (1996), Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997), Morgan (2003), Szymanski (2003), and Stein and Rapoport (2004). Several forms of contest success functions have been used in the literature on the theory of contests.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move subgame. See Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move subgame.…”

Section: B the Sequential-move Subgamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Timing in Contests With Delegation

Baik

Lee

2012

Economic Inquiry

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We study two-player contests in which each player hires a delegate, and the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort. First, we look closely at the delegates' decisions on when to expend their effort, given contracts between the players and the delegates, and look at the players' decisions on their contracts. Then, we compare the outcomes of the endogenous-timing framework with those of the simultaneous-move framework. We show that the higher-valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her opponent, the delegate of the higher-valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart's, the equilibrium expected payoff of the delegate of the higher-valuation player is greater than that of his counterpart, and economic rent for each delegate exists. We show that, in the endogenous-timing framework, each player offers her delegate better contingent compensation, each delegate's expected payoff is greater, and each player's expected payoff is smaller, as compared with the simultaneous-move framework. (JEL D72)

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“…Existence and uniqueness of all equilibria in this section follows from Theorem 1 in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi ().…”

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confidence: 92%

Contests with endogenous deadlines

Seel

2017

Economics Manag Strategy

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This paper analyzes the problem of a contest designer who chooses a starting time and a deadline of the contest to maximize discounted total effort by the contestants. Each contestant secretly decides how much effort to exert between the starting time and the deadline. At the deadline, the contestant who exerted most effort wins a prize, which consists of the endowment of the designer and collected interest. The contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the main model, the designer should announce the contest immediately with a short deadline to promote intense competition. I analyze how the optimal starting time and deadline change for a variable contest prize, different types of asymmetries, a Tullock lottery contest success function, and different goal functions of the designer.

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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games

Cited by 49 publications

References 6 publications

Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation*

Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation*

Endogenous Timing in Contests With Delegation

Contests with endogenous deadlines

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