On the expenditure-dependence of children’s resource shares

Menon, Martina; Pendakur, Krishna; Perali, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.012

Cited by 62 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…To obtain the sharing rule φ k , we then anchor the income scaling function m k (ψ) to individual total expenditures y k , incorporating the identifying information about assignable consumption as φ k = m k (ψ)y k . In line with the theory results in Chavas et al (2014) and the empirical findings of Menon et al (2012), m k is independent of total expenditure. This strategy enables the identification of the parameters of the m k function and of resource sharing within a Pareto efficient family.…”

Section: Demand System Estimationsupporting

confidence: 90%

Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality

Chavas

Menon

Pagani

et al. 2018

Theoretical Economics

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We investigate the relationship between the individual and household indirect utility functions in the context of a collective household model. Our analysis produces new results that explain how the rule governing the distribution of resources among household members is related to the measurement of household welfare and intra-household inequality. We show that in a collective model of private consumption, income shares are equal to the product of two weights: the Pareto weight and a distribution weight reflecting income effects across individuals. For a weighted Bergsonian representation of household utility and general assumptions about individual preferences, we derive the associated household welfare functions and intra-household inequality measures belonging to a family of entropy indexes. We illustrate our findings with an empirical application that estimates a collective demand system to recover associated individual and household welfare functions along with the measures of intra-household inequality. This is the first application that estimates the Pareto weight and examines its role within a measure of income dispersion among household members.We are grateful to Rolf Aaberge, Ugo Colombino, Stefan Hoderlein, Eleonora Matteazzi, Lars Nesheim, various seminar and conference participants, the editor, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Nicola Tommasi for excellent research assistance. All errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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Section: Demand System Estimationsupporting

confidence: 90%

Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality

Chavas

Menon

Pagani

et al. 2018

Theoretical Economics

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“…This result, which we obtained through our RP based approach, confirms earlier evclude leisure in their consumption models. See also Menon, Pendakur, and Perali (2012), who provided additional empirical evidence supporting this assumption. idence found in the literature, which shows that a household member's bargaining power is generally higher when her/his relative wage is higher (see Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Blundell et al (2007), and Oreffice (2011), among many others).…”

Section: The Relation Between Sharing Rule Bounds Total Income and mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…The most common response is to ignore the problem, and only report estimates of the impact of distribution factors on the sharing rule (see, e.g., Browning et al (1994), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), or Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005)). A second approach is to try to collect more information on the consumption of individual household members (see, e.g., Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2012a), and Menon, Pendakur, and Perali (2012)). This method is inherently limited by the difficulty of measuring the fraction of shared goods that is consumed by each individual, and cannot deal with potential externalities within a household.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing Rule Identification for General Collective Consumption Models

Cherchye¹,

Rock²,

Lewbel³

et al. 2015

Econometrica

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We propose a method to identify bounds (i.e. set identification) on the sharing rule for a general collective household consumption model. Unlike the effects of distribution factors, it is well known that the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identified without strong assumptions on preferences across households of different compositions. Our new results show that, though not point identified without these assumptions, bounds on the sharing rule can still be obtained. We get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household's continuous aggregate demand functions. We obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public, private, or assignable within the household, though having such information tightens the bounds. An empirical application demonstrates the practical usefulness of our method. JEL Classification:D11, D12, D13, C14, C30

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“…First, they focus only on household demand for private assignable goods, that is, goods for which we can assume that only one member consumes them and for which there are no economies of scale. Second, they assume that preferences of household members are similar across people (SAP), instead of identical to singles (a common assumption in BCL-type models), and that η j ⊥ y (Menon et al, 2012). Then, under PIGLOG utility functions, the resulting system maintains the multiplicative feature and takes the following form:…”

Section: Trade-offs In the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%