On-the-Fly Trace Generation and Textual Trace Analysis and Their Applications to the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

Changkhanak

2012

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SUMMARYMany Petri nets-based methods have been developed and applied to analyze cryptographic protocols. Most of them offer the analysis of one attack trace only. Only a few of them provide the analysis of multiple attack traces, but they are rather inefficient. Similarly, the limitation of the analysis of one attack trace occurs in most model checking methods for cryptographic protocols. Recently, we proposed a simple but practical Petri nets-based model checking methodology for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, which offers an efficient analysis of all attack traces. In our previous analysis, we assume that the underlying cryptographic algorithms are black boxes, and attackers cannot learn anything from cipher text if they do not have a correct key. In this paper, we relax this assumption by considering some algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm. Then, we apply our new method to TMN authenticated key exchange protocol as a case study. Surprisingly, we obtain a very efficient analysis when the numbers of attack traces and states are large, and we discover two new attacks which exploit the algebraic properties of the encryption.

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 86%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On-the-Fly Trace Generation Approach to the Security Analysis of the TMN Protocol with Homomorphic Property: A Petri Nets-Based Method

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

Changkhanak

2012

Self Cite

“…Our CPN method here is based on the CPN approaches that we have developed earlier in [17,20]. There are fIve steps.…”

Section: A Our Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently in [16][17][18][19][20], our group has developed a new CPN method to analyze cryptographic protocols. Our methodology offers an efficient analysis of multiple attack traces, and is essentially independent of model checking tools for the full and explicit state space analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security analysis of the TMN protocol by using Coloured Petri Nets: On-the-fly trace generation method and homomorphic property

2011 Eighth International Joint Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering (JCSSE)

Changkhanak

2011

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Ahstract-The TMN protocol is a secure key exchange protocol for mobile communication system. Its security has been analyzed thoroughly by many approaches, and many attacks have been found. Recently, we have developed a new Coloured Petri Net (CPN) approach to analyze cryptographic protocols, and then applied it to analyze the TMN protocol with the homomorphic property of the underlying public-key encryption. As preliminary analyses, we found two new attacks of the protocol. In this paper, we extend our previous works in two aspects. Firstly, we compare the performance between our new method and a traditional method to analyze attacks in cryptographic protocols.Surprisingly, our method is more efficient when the number of states and traces are large. Secondly, we found three new and interesting variants of our previous attacks.

“…For TMN protocol, we found two new multi-session attacks. This paper is an extended version of our previous works [45,39,40,41] in that here we formalize our on-the-fly method, provide an analysis of our method and discover more new attacks in both Micali's ECS1 and Bao's modified ECS1. In addition, in this paper we discuss more details of three issues which are our CPN model for TMN, a performance analysis of our method for ECS1 and comparisons between our method and existing works.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On-the-fly Trace Generation Approach to the Security Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols: Coloured Petri Nets-based Method

Fundamenta Informaticae

Sornkhom

2014

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Most Petri nets-based methods that have been developed to analyze cryptographic protocols provide the analysis of one attack trace only. Only a few of them offer the analysis of multiple attack traces, but they are rather inefficient. Analogously, the limitation of the analysis of one attack trace occurs in most model checking methods for cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we propose a very simple but practical Coloured Petri nets-based model checking method for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, which overcomes these limitations. Our method offers an efficient analysis of multiple attack traces. We apply our method to two case studies which are TMN authenticated key exchanged protocol and Micali's contract signing protocol. Surprisingly, our simple method is very efficient when the numbers of attack traces and states are large. Also, we find many new attacks in those protocols.